From e4bb7ea15ad58affcd4eb6da5674a839d57bfd61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claude Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:27:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Add optional philosophy of causality chapter Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019xfc9nPjZNQc9UFuokX1us --- _quarto-book.yml | 1 + intro-causal.qmd | 2 +- philosophy-of-causality.qmd | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ references/references.bib | 89 +++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 philosophy-of-causality.qmd diff --git a/_quarto-book.yml b/_quarto-book.yml index 439aa85..2bd6337 100644 --- a/_quarto-book.yml +++ b/_quarto-book.yml @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ book: chapters: - index.qmd - intro-causal.qmd + - philosophy-of-causality.qmd - collider-bias.qmd - bias-analyses.qmd - d_in_d.qmd diff --git a/intro-causal.qmd b/intro-causal.qmd index ed5a09f..c6b0e09 100644 --- a/intro-causal.qmd +++ b/intro-causal.qmd @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ {{< include macros.qmd >}} -# Introduction to causal inference +# Introduction to causal inference {#sec-intro-causal} ## Introduction diff --git a/philosophy-of-causality.qmd b/philosophy-of-causality.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1d7af6 --- /dev/null +++ b/philosophy-of-causality.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +{{< include macros.qmd >}} + +# Philosophy of causality {#sec-philosophy-causality} + +::: {.callout-note} +## Optional reading + +This chapter is background. +Nothing later in the book depends on it, +but it explains where the potential-outcomes definitions in @sec-intro-causal come from, +and why they carry the assumptions they do. +::: + +## Why look at philosophy at all? + +The book defines a cause in terms of potential outcomes +(@def-cause). +That definition is one answer among several +to a question philosophers have argued over for centuries: +what does it mean to say that one thing causes another? +Seeing the other answers +makes it easier to see what the potential-outcomes answer +includes, what it leaves out, and why. + +Each account below is a family of views, +and this chapter simplifies all of them. +The cited sources give the full arguments. + +## Five accounts of causation + +### Regularity {#sec-regularity} + +::: {#def-regularity-view} + +#### Regularity view of causation + +On the **regularity view**, +saying that $A$ causes $B$ means that +events like $A$ are always followed by events like $B$, +with $A$ coming first and the two occurring close together in space and time. + +::: + +Hume's discussion of causation is the standard starting point [@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. +His point is that we never observe a necessary connection between cause and effect. +We observe only that one kind of event reliably follows another. + +::: {#exm-regularity} + +#### Regularity and smoking + +Under a strict reading, +"smoking causes lung cancer" would be false, +because many smokers never develop lung cancer +and some non-smokers do. + +::: + +@exm-regularity shows the main weakness: +strict regularities are rare in epidemiology, +where outcomes are stochastic and have many contributing causes. +Mackie's refinement treats a cause as +an insufficient but necessary part of a condition +that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the effect [@mackie1965causes]. +That version fits "component causes" better. + +### Counterfactual dependence {#sec-counterfactual-account} + +::: {#def-counterfactual-account} + +#### Counterfactual account of causation + +On the **counterfactual account**, +event $A$ causes event $B$ if +$A$ and $B$ both occurred +and, had $A$ not occurred, $B$ would not have occurred. + +::: + +Hume also wrote a second, counterfactual formulation +of his definition [@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. +Lewis later developed it into a full theory +based on comparing the actual world with the closest possible worlds +in which $A$ does not occur [@lewis1973causation]. + +This is the account closest to @def-cause. +A potential outcome $Y(a')$ for an action $a'$ that did not occur +is a counterfactual outcome, +so the potential-outcomes framework makes counterfactual dependence +something a statistical model can describe [@holland1986]. + +The account has two well-known difficulties. +First, "the closest possible world" is a philosophical notion +that has no obvious empirical meaning. +Second, it handles redundant causes badly: +if two sufficient causes were both present, +removing either one leaves the effect in place, +so neither counts as a cause. +The potential-outcomes framework avoids the first difficulty +by defining the counterfactual in terms of a specific action (see below), +and mostly sidesteps the second +by asking about the effect of one well-specified action at a time. + +### Manipulation and intervention {#sec-manipulability} + +::: {#def-manipulability} + +#### Manipulability account of causation + +On the **manipulability account**, +$A$ is a cause of $B$ +if an intervention that changes $A$, +and that affects nothing else that bears on $B$, +would change $B$ [@woodward2003making]. + +::: + +Here the cause is something that someone could in principle change. +Holland summarized this view as "no causation without manipulation" [@holland1986]. + +This is the account that the book's definitions +(@def-action and @def-cause) take on: +a cause is an *action*, +and the effect is a contrast between outcomes under different actions. +The consequence is that questions about attributes we cannot intervene on +(for example, "what is the causal effect of sex or of race?") +are not well posed until we specify an intervention. + +### Probabilistic causation {#sec-probabilistic} + +::: {#def-probabilistic-view} + +#### Probabilistic view of causation + +On the **probabilistic view**, +$A$ causes $B$ if +$A$ raises the probability of $B$, +after holding fixed other relevant factors [@suppes1970probabilistic]. + +::: + +This view repairs the regularity view for stochastic outcomes. +It also matches how epidemiologists work: +a risk factor changes the probability of disease +and does not determine it. +Its main difficulty is the one every observational study faces. +Probability raising can come from confounding, +so "after holding fixed other relevant factors" is doing the heavy lifting, +and the view does not say which factors those are. +The later chapters on exchangeability and bias +are in part a detailed answer to that question. + +### Mechanisms {#sec-mechanisms} + +::: {#def-mechanistic-view} + +#### Mechanistic view of causation + +On the **mechanistic view**, +$A$ causes $B$ if +there is a mechanism, +an organized set of entities and activities, +that links $A$ to $B$ [@machamer2000thinking]. + +::: + +Mechanistic evidence, +such as a known biological pathway, +often strengthens a causal conclusion +even when the statistical evidence is limited. +The potential-outcomes framework does not require a mechanism +to define an effect. +It defines the effect of an action on an outcome +without describing how the action works. + +## What the potential-outcomes framework takes from these accounts + +@tbl-accounts summarizes how each account relates to this book. + +| Account | Core idea | Relation to this book | +|---|---|---| +| Regularity | Events of type $A$ are followed by events of type $B$ | Motivates asking whether an association is causal; too strict for stochastic outcomes | +| Counterfactual | $B$ would not have occurred without $A$ | Basis of potential outcomes (@def-potential-outcome, @def-counterfactual) | +| Manipulability | A cause is something one could change | Basis of the action-based definitions (@def-action, @def-cause) | +| Probabilistic | Causes raise probabilities | Matches estimands defined on risks and means | +| Mechanistic | Causes work through mechanisms | Not needed for definitions; useful as supporting evidence | + +: Philosophical accounts of causation and where they appear in this book. {#tbl-accounts} + +Two assumptions in the book +come straight from the counterfactual and manipulability accounts. + +**Consistency** (@def-consistency) +says that the outcome we observe under action $a$ +equals the potential outcome $Y(a)$. +That statement is only meaningful +if "action $a$" names one thing. +@hernan2008obesity and @hernan2016water +argue this using examples such as obesity and body mass index: +different ways of changing the exposure +can lead to different outcomes, +so a question about "the" effect of the exposure is ambiguous +until the intervention is specified. +@vanderweele2013versions formalize the point as +the problem of multiple versions of treatment. + +**Well-defined interventions** +are the practical form of the manipulability account. +If we cannot say what intervention would set $A$ to $a$, +we cannot say what $Y(a)$ refers to, +and consistency has nothing to hold on to. + +::: {#exm-interventions} + +#### A well-defined and an ill-defined question + +"What would a patient's blood pressure be +if they took 10 mg of a particular antihypertensive daily for a year?" +names a specific intervention, +so $Y(a)$ is meaningful. + +"What would a patient's blood pressure be +if they had a lower body weight?" +does not. +Diet, exercise, surgery, and illness all lower weight, +and they plausibly affect blood pressure differently. +We would need to specify a particular intervention +to define the causal question. + +::: + +## Not everyone agrees + +The manipulability requirement is contested. +Some authors hold that causal questions about attributes +such as race or sex are meaningful without a specified intervention. +Others reply that +such questions can only mean something +once they are tied to an intervention on a related, manipulable variable. +This book follows the potential-outcomes tradition +and requires a specified intervention. +That choice is a design decision for the course, +and the other accounts above remain legitimate frameworks. + +## Further reading + +- The original discussion of the regularity and counterfactual formulations is Hume's *Enquiry* [@hume1748enquiry]. +- @lewis1973causation is the standard statement of the counterfactual account. +- @woodward2003making develops the interventionist (manipulability) account in detail. +- @holland1986 connects the philosophical discussion to statistical causal inference. +- @hernan2016water gives an epidemiologist's argument for well-defined interventions. diff --git a/references/references.bib b/references/references.bib index 0b4fc72..5179546 100644 --- a/references/references.bib +++ b/references/references.bib @@ -193,3 +193,92 @@ @misc{bcallaway_cic note = {qte R package reference manual} } + +@book{hume1748enquiry, + author = {Hume, David}, + title = {An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}, + year = {1748}, + address = {London}, + note = {First published 1748 as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding} +} + +@article{lewis1973causation, + author = {Lewis, David}, + title = {Causation}, + journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, + volume = {70}, + number = {17}, + pages = {556--567}, + year = {1973}, + doi = {10.2307/2025310} +} + +@article{mackie1965causes, + author = {Mackie, J. L.}, + title = {Causes and Conditions}, + journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, + volume = {2}, + number = {4}, + pages = {245--264}, + year = {1965} +} + +@book{suppes1970probabilistic, + author = {Suppes, Patrick}, + title = {A Probabilistic Theory of Causality}, + publisher = {North-Holland}, + address = {Amsterdam}, + year = {1970} +} + +@book{woodward2003making, + author = {Woodward, James}, + title = {Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation}, + publisher = {Oxford University Press}, + address = {New York}, + year = {2003} +} + +@article{machamer2000thinking, + author = {Machamer, Peter and Darden, Lindley and Craver, Carl F.}, + title = {Thinking about Mechanisms}, + journal = {Philosophy of Science}, + volume = {67}, + number = {1}, + pages = {1--25}, + year = {2000}, + doi = {10.1086/392759} +} + +@article{hernan2008obesity, + author = {Hern{\'a}n, M. A. and Taubman, S. L.}, + title = {Does obesity shorten life? {The} importance of well-defined interventions to answer causal questions}, + journal = {International Journal of Obesity}, + volume = {32}, + number = {S3}, + pages = {S8--S14}, + year = {2008}, + doi = {10.1038/ijo.2008.82} +} + +@article{hernan2016water, + author = {Hern{\'a}n, Miguel A.}, + title = {Does water kill? {A} call for less casual causal inferences}, + journal = {Annals of Epidemiology}, + volume = {26}, + number = {10}, + pages = {674--680}, + year = {2016}, + doi = {10.1016/j.annepidem.2016.08.016} +} + +@article{vanderweele2013versions, + author = {VanderWeele, Tyler J. and Hern{\'a}n, Miguel A.}, + title = {Causal Inference under Multiple Versions of Treatment}, + journal = {Journal of Causal Inference}, + volume = {1}, + number = {1}, + pages = {1--20}, + year = {2013}, + doi = {10.1515/jci-2012-0002} +} From 1199892af373ba602b10f3651a2c0dc7c9ae39d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claude Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:32:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Split chapter divs into definitions/ files, add examples, fix forward reference and line breaks Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019xfc9nPjZNQc9UFuokX1us --- bias-analyses.qmd | 2 +- definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd | 11 ++ definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd | 11 ++ definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd | 11 ++ definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd | 10 ++ definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd | 11 ++ definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd | 15 ++ definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd | 19 ++ definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd | 15 ++ definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd | 14 ++ definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd | 12 ++ definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd | 11 ++ philosophy-of-causality.qmd | 189 +++++++------------- 13 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-) create mode 100644 definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd create mode 100644 definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd diff --git a/bias-analyses.qmd b/bias-analyses.qmd index 1cd2fab..3ebe27a 100644 --- a/bias-analyses.qmd +++ b/bias-analyses.qmd @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ {{< include macros.qmd >}} -# Bias analyses +# Bias analyses {#sec-bias-analyses} {{< include _sec-bias-analyses.qmd >}} diff --git a/definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd b/definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e245c53 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +:::{#def-counterfactual-account} + +#### Counterfactual account of causation + +On the **counterfactual account**, +event $A$ causes event $B$ if +$A$ and $B$ both occurred, +and, had $A$ not occurred, +$B$ would not have occurred. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd b/definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7964a3e --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +:::{#def-manipulability} + +#### Manipulability account of causation + +On the **manipulability account**, +$A$ is a cause of $B$ +if an intervention that changes $A$, +and that affects nothing else that bears on $B$, +would change $B$ [@woodward2003making]. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd b/definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e86e19 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +:::{#def-mechanistic-view} + +#### Mechanistic view of causation + +On the **mechanistic view**, +$A$ causes $B$ if +there is a mechanism, +an organized set of entities and activities, +that links $A$ to $B$ [@machamer2000thinking]. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd b/definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28b3026 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +:::{#def-probabilistic-view} + +#### Probabilistic view of causation + +On the **probabilistic view**, +$A$ causes $B$ if +$A$ raises the probability of $B$ +after other relevant factors are held fixed [@suppes1970probabilistic]. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd b/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2dfaf72 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +:::{#def-regularity-view} + +#### Regularity view of causation + +On the **regularity view**, +saying that $A$ causes $B$ means that +events like $A$ are always followed by events like $B$, +with $A$ coming first +and the two occurring close together in space and time. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd b/definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9bd9ddd --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +:::{#exm-counterfactual-account} + + +#### Counterfactual account and smoking cessation + +Suppose a patient quit smoking +and did not develop lung cancer. +On the counterfactual account, +quitting prevented the cancer +only if the patient would have developed lung cancer +had they kept smoking. +We never observe that second scenario. +It is the counterfactual outcome of @def-counterfactual. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd b/definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9df2b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +:::{#exm-interventions} + + +#### A well-defined and an ill-defined question + +"What would a patient's blood pressure be +if they took 10 mg of a particular antihypertensive daily for a year?" +names a specific intervention, +so $Y(a)$ is meaningful. + +"What would a patient's blood pressure be +if they had a lower body weight?" +does not. +Diet, exercise, surgery, and illness all lower weight, +and they plausibly affect blood pressure differently. +We would need to specify a particular intervention +to define the causal question. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd b/definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b59719e --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +:::{#exm-manipulability} + + +#### Manipulability and a patient's sex + +"What is the effect of a smoking-cessation program on lung cancer risk?" +names an intervention that can be assigned, +so it fits the manipulability account. + +"What is the effect of a patient's sex on lung cancer risk?" +does not name an intervention. +On this account the question is not well posed +until we say which intervention is meant. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd b/definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52e451e --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +:::{#exm-mechanistic-view} + + +#### Mechanism and smoking + +A mechanistic account of smoking and lung cancer +would describe the steps between inhaling smoke +and the growth of a tumor, +such as damage to cells' DNA. +Evidence about such steps +can support the causal claim +alongside the statistical evidence. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd b/definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a845bd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +:::{#exm-probabilistic-view} + + +#### Probability raising and smoking + +Smoking raises the probability of lung cancer +among people who are alike in age and other relevant factors, +and it does not make lung cancer certain. +Under the probabilistic view, +that is enough for smoking to be a cause of lung cancer. + +::: diff --git a/definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd b/definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..deed4b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +:::{#exm-regularity} + + +#### Regularity and smoking + +Under a strict reading of the regularity view, +"smoking causes lung cancer" would be false, +because many smokers never develop lung cancer +and some non-smokers do. + +::: diff --git a/philosophy-of-causality.qmd b/philosophy-of-causality.qmd index f1d7af6..c3f7285 100644 --- a/philosophy-of-causality.qmd +++ b/philosophy-of-causality.qmd @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ ## Optional reading This chapter is background. -Nothing later in the book depends on it, -but it explains where the potential-outcomes definitions in @sec-intro-causal come from, +Nothing later in the book depends on it. +It explains where the potential-outcomes definitions in @sec-intro-causal come from, and why they carry the assumptions they do. ::: @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ That definition is one answer among several to a question philosophers have argued over for centuries: what does it mean to say that one thing causes another? Seeing the other answers -makes it easier to see what the potential-outcomes answer -includes, what it leaves out, and why. +makes it easier to see what the potential-outcomes answer includes, +what it leaves out, +and why. Each account below is a family of views, and this chapter simplifies all of them. @@ -30,64 +31,45 @@ The cited sources give the full arguments. ### Regularity {#sec-regularity} -::: {#def-regularity-view} +{{< include definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd >}} -#### Regularity view of causation - -On the **regularity view**, -saying that $A$ causes $B$ means that -events like $A$ are always followed by events like $B$, -with $A$ coming first and the two occurring close together in space and time. - -::: - -Hume's discussion of causation is the standard starting point [@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. -His point is that we never observe a necessary connection between cause and effect. +Hume's discussion of causation is the standard starting point +[@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. +His point is that we never observe a necessary connection +between cause and effect. We observe only that one kind of event reliably follows another. -::: {#exm-regularity} - -#### Regularity and smoking - -Under a strict reading, -"smoking causes lung cancer" would be false, -because many smokers never develop lung cancer -and some non-smokers do. - -::: +{{< include definitions/_exm-regularity.qmd >}} @exm-regularity shows the main weakness: strict regularities are rare in epidemiology, -where outcomes are stochastic and have many contributing causes. +where outcomes are stochastic +and have many contributing causes. Mackie's refinement treats a cause as an insufficient but necessary part of a condition -that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the effect [@mackie1965causes]. +that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the effect +[@mackie1965causes]. That version fits "component causes" better. ### Counterfactual dependence {#sec-counterfactual-account} -::: {#def-counterfactual-account} +{{< include definitions/_def-counterfactual-account.qmd >}} -#### Counterfactual account of causation - -On the **counterfactual account**, -event $A$ causes event $B$ if -$A$ and $B$ both occurred -and, had $A$ not occurred, $B$ would not have occurred. - -::: - -Hume also wrote a second, counterfactual formulation -of his definition [@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. +Hume also wrote a second, counterfactual formulation of his definition +[@hume1748enquiry, sec. 7]. Lewis later developed it into a full theory -based on comparing the actual world with the closest possible worlds -in which $A$ does not occur [@lewis1973causation]. +based on comparing the actual world +with the closest possible worlds in which $A$ does not occur +[@lewis1973causation]. -This is the account closest to @def-cause. +{{< include definitions/_exm-counterfactual-account.qmd >}} + +This account is the closest to @def-cause. A potential outcome $Y(a')$ for an action $a'$ that did not occur is a counterfactual outcome, so the potential-outcomes framework makes counterfactual dependence -something a statistical model can describe [@holland1986]. +something a statistical model can describe +[@holland1986]. The account has two well-known difficulties. First, "the closest possible world" is a philosophical notion @@ -97,72 +79,49 @@ if two sufficient causes were both present, removing either one leaves the effect in place, so neither counts as a cause. The potential-outcomes framework avoids the first difficulty -by defining the counterfactual in terms of a specific action (see below), +by defining the counterfactual in terms of a specific action +(@def-action, @sec-manipulability), and mostly sidesteps the second by asking about the effect of one well-specified action at a time. ### Manipulation and intervention {#sec-manipulability} -::: {#def-manipulability} - -#### Manipulability account of causation - -On the **manipulability account**, -$A$ is a cause of $B$ -if an intervention that changes $A$, -and that affects nothing else that bears on $B$, -would change $B$ [@woodward2003making]. - -::: +{{< include definitions/_def-manipulability.qmd >}} Here the cause is something that someone could in principle change. -Holland summarized this view as "no causation without manipulation" [@holland1986]. +Holland summarized this view as "no causation without manipulation" +[@holland1986]. -This is the account that the book's definitions +{{< include definitions/_exm-manipulability.qmd >}} + +This account is the one that the book's definitions (@def-action and @def-cause) take on: a cause is an *action*, and the effect is a contrast between outcomes under different actions. -The consequence is that questions about attributes we cannot intervene on -(for example, "what is the causal effect of sex or of race?") -are not well posed until we specify an intervention. ### Probabilistic causation {#sec-probabilistic} -::: {#def-probabilistic-view} - -#### Probabilistic view of causation - -On the **probabilistic view**, -$A$ causes $B$ if -$A$ raises the probability of $B$, -after holding fixed other relevant factors [@suppes1970probabilistic]. - -::: +{{< include definitions/_def-probabilistic-view.qmd >}} This view repairs the regularity view for stochastic outcomes. It also matches how epidemiologists work: a risk factor changes the probability of disease and does not determine it. + +{{< include definitions/_exm-probabilistic-view.qmd >}} + Its main difficulty is the one every observational study faces. Probability raising can come from confounding, -so "after holding fixed other relevant factors" is doing the heavy lifting, +so "after other relevant factors are held fixed" does the heavy lifting, and the view does not say which factors those are. -The later chapters on exchangeability and bias -are in part a detailed answer to that question. +The chapter on bias analyses (@sec-bias-analyses) +discusses how to handle that question in practice. ### Mechanisms {#sec-mechanisms} -::: {#def-mechanistic-view} +{{< include definitions/_def-mechanistic-view.qmd >}} -#### Mechanistic view of causation - -On the **mechanistic view**, -$A$ causes $B$ if -there is a mechanism, -an organized set of entities and activities, -that links $A$ to $B$ [@machamer2000thinking]. - -::: +{{< include definitions/_exm-mechanistic-view.qmd >}} Mechanistic evidence, such as a known biological pathway, @@ -188,46 +147,28 @@ without describing how the action works. : Philosophical accounts of causation and where they appear in this book. {#tbl-accounts} Two assumptions in the book -come straight from the counterfactual and manipulability accounts. - -**Consistency** (@def-consistency) -says that the outcome we observe under action $a$ -equals the potential outcome $Y(a)$. -That statement is only meaningful -if "action $a$" names one thing. -@hernan2008obesity and @hernan2016water -argue this using examples such as obesity and body mass index: -different ways of changing the exposure -can lead to different outcomes, -so a question about "the" effect of the exposure is ambiguous -until the intervention is specified. -@vanderweele2013versions formalize the point as -the problem of multiple versions of treatment. - -**Well-defined interventions** -are the practical form of the manipulability account. -If we cannot say what intervention would set $A$ to $a$, -we cannot say what $Y(a)$ refers to, -and consistency has nothing to hold on to. - -::: {#exm-interventions} - -#### A well-defined and an ill-defined question - -"What would a patient's blood pressure be -if they took 10 mg of a particular antihypertensive daily for a year?" -names a specific intervention, -so $Y(a)$ is meaningful. - -"What would a patient's blood pressure be -if they had a lower body weight?" -does not. -Diet, exercise, surgery, and illness all lower weight, -and they plausibly affect blood pressure differently. -We would need to specify a particular intervention -to define the causal question. - -::: +come straight from the counterfactual and manipulability accounts: + +- **Consistency** (@def-consistency) + says that the outcome we observe under action $a$ + equals the potential outcome $Y(a)$. + That statement is only meaningful + if "action $a$" names one thing. + @hernan2008obesity and @hernan2016water + argue this using examples such as obesity and body mass index: + different ways of changing the exposure + can lead to different outcomes, + so a question about "the" effect of the exposure is ambiguous + until the intervention is specified. + @vanderweele2013versions formalize the point as + the problem of multiple versions of treatment. +- **Well-defined interventions** + are the practical form of the manipulability account. + If we cannot say what intervention would set $A$ to $a$, + we cannot say what $Y(a)$ refers to, + and consistency has nothing to hold on to. + +{{< include definitions/_exm-interventions.qmd >}} ## Not everyone agrees From cdb4c916497e33b128ba3d4fa7297bfe11fa741a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claude Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:40:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Make constant conjunction explicit in the regularity-view definition Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019xfc9nPjZNQc9UFuokX1us --- definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd b/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd index 2dfaf72..3dfdfc7 100644 --- a/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd +++ b/definitions/_def-regularity-view.qmd @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ On the **regularity view**, saying that $A$ causes $B$ means that -events like $A$ are always followed by events like $B$, +every event like $A$ is followed by an event like $B$ +(a "constant conjunction"), with $A$ coming first and the two occurring close together in space and time.