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ARCHITECTURE.md

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Azure Malware Scanning & File Quarantine architecture

Terms used here: Role-based access control gives people or services permissions according to their roles. DNS turns a service name into the network address used to reach it.

Business and implementation context

Applicants and employees upload documents into an operational platform. Those files must not become downloadable just because storage accepted them. A malware verdict can arrive late, arrive twice, or refer to bytes that have since been replaced.

  • Integrated Defender for Storage scan results with Event Grid, queues and a dedicated Azure Functions processor.
  • Bound saved clean-scan results for the exact files to the exact uploaded file and authorized employee/record before previews or downloads.
  • Added visible upload/file-check status and documented recovery when the processor is stopped or events fail.

Processing path

  1. Authorized upload → Private blob: pending.
  2. Private blob: pending → Microsoft Defender for Storage.
  3. Microsoft Defender for Storage → Event Grid scan result.
  4. Event Grid scan result → Result queue.
  5. Result queue → Dedicated result processor.
  6. Dedicated result processor → Verdict plus exact version.
  7. Verdict plus exact version → Saved clean proof (Clean and matching).
  8. Verdict plus exact version → Blocked file (Malicious).
  9. Verdict plus exact version → Unavailable file (Error or unknown).
  10. Dedicated result processor has a conditional/reference connection to Poison / failed work (processing failure).
  11. Saved clean proof → Employee and record authorization.
  12. Employee and record authorization → Protected preview or download.

View the illustrated project overview.

Implementation layers

Layer What is included
Actual implementation excerpts TypeScript policy/domain functions and their source tests; no hosted adapter or private record
Public local reference Python demonstration and a loopback dashboard using fictional inputs
Infrastructure Terraform resource boundaries, explicit inputs and mock plan tests
Actual cloud evidence Existing platform context; new nonproduction portal captures are optional follow-up evidence

Trust and identity

  • The detection engine is Defender for Storage. The Python program consumes fictional verdicts; it is not an antivirus engine.
  • Quarantine here means private storage plus denied application retrieval. The reference does not automatically move or delete malicious blobs.
  • A clean verdict does not grant access to another employee, and editable blob tags alone are not an authorization authority.
  • The optional paid scan service, event delivery and worker shell are separate default-Off infrastructure choices.

Deployment boundary

Private storage and containers, result/poison queues, Event Grid identity and optional Defender on-upload scanning. The optional Functions Flex shell is Disabled. Host-storage separation, exact RBAC, SQL adapters and private caller routes remain explicit commissioning dependencies.

No resource was applied for this project packaging. A real deployment requires correct identities, network/DNS reachability, permissions, package/schema compatibility and recovery acceptance. The local dashboard is not an internet-facing multi-user application.