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SCALING.md

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Malware scanner scaling and tradeoffs

Choice Strength Weakness / tradeoff
Managed Defender scanning Uses a maintained detection service rather than building an antivirus engine Paid service limits, supported inputs and scan latency still need monitoring
Asynchronous result queue Decouples uploads, event delivery and processing Users need pending status and an operational recovery path
Separate Functions processor Limits business-API privilege and isolates event work Another runtime/identity/queue must be operated
Exact-version clean proof Stops stale verdicts from releasing replacement bytes Requires durable metadata and atomic per-file state transitions
Logical quarantine Blocks ordinary application distribution without moving files Storage operators with separate data permission remain a distinct trust boundary
Fail closed on unknown/error Avoids treating absence of evidence as a clean result Can reduce availability until the failure is resolved

Scale from measured arrival rate, average scan size, result lag and queue age. Bound processor concurrency and retry budgets. Use a shared durable journal rather than independent SQLite workers, and serialize or conditionally update each immutable file's state. Isolate poison work and deduplicate before side effects.

Test storage, event-delivery and database limits before raising throughput. A configured data-volume cap is not a hard spending cap. Blob versions, retained failed files, operations and diagnostics can continue to cost money even when a processor is paused. Define investigation/retention ownership before automating deletion.