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Team mode M11: Private-content access audit and member notice #4149
Every view of another member's private Bot, private Channel, DM or Bot–Bot DM by the Owner or a granted role writes an audit record: who, when and which object.
The Owner sees the audit log in the UI and through CLI audit.
Members see a Settings notice that private content is accessible to authorised administrators.
Acceptance
Audit records are written for each access path (Client, CLI) and are tamper-evident for non-Owners.
No record is written for a member reading their own content.
M11 wire contract (agreed before parallel work; Claude = UI, Codex = logic)
Based on main after M2, M3, M4, M9 (and E4). M10 (#4186) and M6 are landing in parallel; take the next free migration generation at merge time (never hard-coded) and reconcile member-methods.ts.
Who may view. The Owner and holders of privateContent.view (Owner-only grantable, M3). Bots never (spec amendment 2026-11-15): every method below refuses a Bot-initiated or Bot-tool call.
Private objects. Another member's private Bot (profile, Memory files, DMs with it), private Channel, Human–Human DM, and Bot–Bot DM between Bots of other members.
privateObjects { humanId?, kind? } → [{ objectId, kind: 'bot'|'channel'|'dm'|'bot-dm', name, ownerHumanIds }] — names only, no content, no audit record (listing is not viewing).
privateContentOpen { kind, objectId, reason? } → { viewId, object, messages: first page, memoryFiles?: [...] } read-only; writes one audit record per open. Further pages via privateContentPage { viewId, before } (no extra record while the view is open, max 30 minutes).
Refusals: permission-required (details.permission: 'privateContent.view'), object-not-found, own-content (the viewer's own content needs no audited view).
auditLog { after?, limit? } → page; Owner and audit.view holders. Members never see it.
auditVerify → { ok: true } | { ok: false, brokenAt: auditId } — tamper evidence; non-Owners cannot edit or delete records (no such method exists), and the chain detects direct database edits.
No record when someone reads their own content.
Member notice.teamMode gains privateAccessNotice: true in Team mode (members are told authorised administrators can view private content, and that each view is recorded).
CLI: audit list [--after] [--limit], audit verify, private list [--member <username>] [--kind], private open <kind> <id> [--reason]; --as for all.
Client (Claude): Settings › Team › Audit log (Owner / audit.view), member sheet › "View private content" → list → read-only viewer with a "This view is recorded" banner and optional reason; member Settings notice; en + zh.
Tests: every open path (Client RPC, CLI) writes exactly one record; own content writes none; non-holders refused; Bot callers refused; hash chain verify detects an edited and a deleted row; members cannot read the log; CLI --as parity.
Completed by merged PR #4220 (its body linked this issue but did not use a closing keyword). Acceptance evidence in #4220: audit rows are written for Client and CLI opens, audit verify → { ok: true } and the hash chain plus durable head make edits or deletions fail verification for non-Owners; opening your own content is refused (own-content) and writes no row. Real-Host e2e with Owner + two members is recorded in the PR. The M15 real-LLM security run is tracked in #4197.
Activity
DoodleBears commentedon Nov 14, 2026
Agent work claim
claude/local/74a5ee4a-f6fe-4aab-870f-5e465b0b8474(not a DSH Session)claude/4149-private-audit(frommain; Codex sub-branchcodex/4149-logic)M11 wire contract (agreed before parallel work; Claude = UI, Codex = logic)
Based on
mainafter M2, M3, M4, M9 (and E4). M10 (#4186) and M6 are landing in parallel; take the next free migration generation at merge time (never hard-coded) and reconcilemember-methods.ts.Who may view. The Owner and holders of
privateContent.view(Owner-only grantable, M3). Bots never (spec amendment 2026-11-15): every method below refuses a Bot-initiated or Bot-tool call.Private objects. Another member's private Bot (profile, Memory files, DMs with it), private Channel, Human–Human DM, and Bot–Bot DM between Bots of other members.
privateObjects { humanId?, kind? }→[{ objectId, kind: 'bot'|'channel'|'dm'|'bot-dm', name, ownerHumanIds }]— names only, no content, no audit record (listing is not viewing).privateContentOpen { kind, objectId, reason? }→{ viewId, object, messages: first page, memoryFiles?: [...] }read-only; writes one audit record per open. Further pages viaprivateContentPage { viewId, before }(no extra record while the view is open, max 30 minutes).permission-required(details.permission: 'privateContent.view'),object-not-found,own-content(the viewer's own content needs no audited view).Audit log. Append-only, hash-chained records
{ auditId, at, viewerHumanId, viewerName, kind, objectId, objectName, ownerHumanIds, reason?, prevHash, hash }.auditLog { after?, limit? }→ page; Owner andaudit.viewholders. Members never see it.auditVerify→{ ok: true } | { ok: false, brokenAt: auditId }— tamper evidence; non-Owners cannot edit or delete records (no such method exists), and the chain detects direct database edits.Member notice.
teamModegainsprivateAccessNotice: truein Team mode (members are told authorised administrators can view private content, and that each view is recorded).CLI:
audit list [--after] [--limit],audit verify,private list [--member <username>] [--kind],private open <kind> <id> [--reason];--asfor all.Client (Claude): Settings › Team › Audit log (Owner /
audit.view), member sheet › "View private content" → list → read-only viewer with a "This view is recorded" banner and optional reason; member Settings notice; en + zh.Tests: every open path (Client RPC, CLI) writes exactly one record; own content writes none; non-holders refused; Bot callers refused; hash chain verify detects an edited and a deleted row; members cannot read the log; CLI
--asparity.fix(client): page the access log and private views, separate failed c…
fix(team): close private-content authorization gaps
chore(cli): map the private content section to its CLI commands
fix(client): make the private content section searchable and keep it …
fix(client): index the private content row description for settings s…
fix(client): give every private content holder the Team section so se…
DoodleBears commentedon Nov 15, 2026
Completed by merged PR #4220 (its body linked this issue but did not use a closing keyword). Acceptance evidence in #4220: audit rows are written for Client and CLI opens,
audit verify→{ ok: true }and the hash chain plus durable head make edits or deletions fail verification for non-Owners; opening your own content is refused (own-content) and writes no row. Real-Host e2e with Owner + two members is recorded in the PR. The M15 real-LLM security run is tracked in #4197.