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Security: Flo-Schilli/mynextscreen

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Only the latest release receives fixes. The project is deployed from main via GHCR images, so the newest tag is what is expected to be running.

Version Supported
latest release yes
anything older no

Reporting a vulnerability

While this repository is private, open an issue here: only collaborators can see it, so the report stays private by construction.

Once this repository is public, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead — Security → "Report a vulnerability" — and do not open a public issue. That route has to be switched on first (Settings → Security → Private vulnerability reporting); it is unavailable on private repositories, which is why it is not the primary channel here yet.

Either way, please do not include working exploit code in the first report — a description of the affected route or component, the preconditions, and the impact is enough to start.

What helps most:

  • the affected component (backend route, player, admin SPA, deployment)
  • what an attacker needs beforehand: no account, any account, an org role, a screen API key
  • the effect: cross-tenant read or write, privilege escalation, code execution, denial of service
  • the version or commit you tested

You can expect an acknowledgement within a week. Fixes for anything that lets a tenant reach another tenant's data are prioritised above everything else.

Scope

In scope: the backend API, the admin SPA, the player, the LG webOS shell, the container images and the Ansible deployment in this repository.

Out of scope: findings against a third-party service the platform integrates with (report those to that vendor), and reports produced by a scanner without a description of the actual impact here.

Notes for operators

Several defaults matter for the security of a deployment and are not enforced by the software:

  • JWT_ACCESS_SECRET must be a strong random value of at least 32 characters.
  • vault_mynextscreen_postgres_password has no default — the deployment fails without it, on purpose.
  • SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is mandatory: every stored secret — including the users' TOTP secrets — is encrypted with it and the database rejects plaintext. Keep a backup of the key apart from database dumps; losing it means every user with MFA has to be reset.
  • Super-admins always use a second factor (TOTP). Consider requiring it for organisations as well (organisation settings); it then applies to every member in all of their organisations.
  • A super-admin who has lost both the authenticator and the recovery codes, with no second super-admin to reset them, can only be recovered from the database — see Emergency: the only super-admin is locked out in docs/configuration.md. That path writes no audit entry; keeping two super-admins avoids it.
  • SIGNUP_ENABLED=false closes self-registration if the instance is not meant to be open.
  • Reaching the backend only through the reverse proxy is what applies TLS, the security headers, rate limiting and fail2ban; the published container ports bind to loopback for that reason.

There aren't any published security advisories