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Security: MARUCIE/dot2api

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported releases

Security fixes target the latest released version. Deployment operators remain responsible for upgrading dependencies and reviewing configuration. No third-party security audit is claimed.

Reporting

Do not put credentials, task contents, or exploitable deployment details in public issues. For a hosted repository with private vulnerability reporting enabled, use its Security tab. If no private reporting channel is configured, open a minimal issue requesting one without exploit details. Maintainers should enable private reporting before accepting public deployments.

Trust boundaries

Dot2API enforces tenant, identity, queue, and scope checks. Server administrators and anyone with access to the database and encryption key are trusted. Task contents and results are stored as plaintext in SQLite; use encrypted disks and protected backups where required. Callback signing secrets are encrypted with Fernet. Bearer and lease credentials are hashed at rest.

Webhook destinations must resolve exclusively to public IP addresses and use HTTPS on port 443. Connections pin the validated address while retaining TLS hostname verification. Redirects are not followed. Inbound browser-origin requests are rejected. These controls do not replace network egress restrictions or protection against resource exhaustion at the ingress layer.

An API key lets its holder put arbitrary text in front of the Dot. A Dot usually has access to its owner's connected apps and cloud computer, so a caller may attempt to make it read private data or act on the owner's behalf, and replies may carry that data back. Dot2API cannot constrain what the Dot does. Issue keys only to callers trusted with the Dot's access, instruct the Dot to answer without using connected apps unless that is intended, and do not relay content from untrusted third parties to it without review.

Treat instructions and returned results as untrusted data. Dot2API is not an execution sandbox, authorization server, or guarantee that an agent obeys task constraints. Execution permissions belong to the receiving agent. Never infer authorization for an external effect from a queued task alone.

Token-bearing endpoint paths are disabled by default. Enabling them transfers responsibility for endpoint secrecy to every client and proxy handling the URL. Revoking a token stops requests authenticated with it; disabling its identity additionally deactivates subscriptions. Credentials and callback secrets must not enter source control or release archives.

There aren't any published security advisories