Report it privately through GitHub: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository. Please do not open a public issue for it. We aim to acknowledge a report within three business days and to agree a disclosure date with you once we understand the issue.

The latest minor release gets security fixes. Before 1.0, that is the only supported line.

pgbulkhead's guarantee is that isolation holds against query bugs and against identity taken from untrusted input. A way to read or write another tenant's rows, or another workspace's rows without a grant, through code that uses the library as documented, is a vulnerability. So is a rendered policy that admits more than its documentation says, a session whose binding outlives its transaction, or a bypass that crosses the tenant wall.

Out of scope, because the guarantee does not claim them (the README's threat model explains each):

• SQL that runs as the app role outside your code (SQL injection, model-written SQL). The app role can set any context setting, including the tenant.
• An app role that is a superuser or has BYPASSRLS, a table without a policy, or a context built from tool arguments or a request body.
• Taking a GucBypass through SQL in the app role. That is its documented cost; RoleBypass exists for when it is too much.