Aether Linux is a work-in-progress development snapshot. It is not audited, not certified, and not hardened for adversarial use.
Nothing in this repository is a security certification or a compliance claim. Installing Aether on a machine holding sensitive or irreplaceable data is your own decision to make and your own risk to carry.
If you are evaluating Aether for real use, assume it will fail a security review. It would.
There is no published security contact address yet. Setting one up requires a domain the project controls and a monitored inbox; publishing an address that nobody watches would be worse than admitting the gap.
Until one exists:
- Open a private channel with the maintainer on GitHub rather than a public issue.
- Do not open a public issue for an unfixed vulnerability.
- Give a concrete reproduction, the affected component, and the impact you believe it has.
Public disclosure before a fix exists is not a violation of policy here, because no coordinated-disclosure deadline has ever been offered. That is a gap in the project, not a permission slip.
These are documented on purpose. They are not discoveries.
- Secure Boot is implemented for UEFI Aether media and installs, but only when Aether's self-signed key hierarchy is enrolled in firmware Setup Mode. The private PK/KEK/db keys are build-host material, not independently custodied release keys; rotation, revocation, physical hardware and firmware beyond OVMF, VMware Workstation and VirtualBox are untested. Kernel module signatures are still not enforced.
- Kernel module signature support is compiled in but signatures are not enforced.
/bootis not encrypted; only the root filesystem is covered by LUKS2.- Hibernation is disabled pending an encrypted-resume design. Old plaintext data already written to existing disks is not retroactively erased or encrypted.
- There is no TPM enrollment or attestation.
- Most desktop applications remain unconfined by AppArmor. A small number of
policies ship, including one for
timesyncdplus a negative-access test. - Policy availability must never be read as universal application protection.
- The build and test environments use known development credentials. These are not secrets and must never be published.
- Backup credentials are root-readable local files so unattended operation works. Root compromise therefore exposes them.
- Update signing keys, TUF role keys, Secure Boot PK/KEK/db keys and object-storage upload credentials are not yet separated into independent custody. Keys on one online builder do not provide compromise resilience, and production Secure Boot revocation/rotation has not been tested. A disposable OVMF lab fixture exercises signed dbx and SBAT revocation using test keys; it is not a production key or update process.
- The object-storage bucket used during development is private development storage, not a production update repository, and its token has expired.
- SSH is not installed or enabled by this build.
- The installer does not convert an existing disk in place; it is whole-disk.
- The live ISO makes no persistent changes — and equally offers no rollback.
- Selecting X11 to obtain VMware clipboard support weakens isolation between applications sharing that session.
- Forwarding is denied by default, so container routing and VPN gateways need an explicit reviewed policy. Treat this as a footgun, not a feature.
- No independent security assessment has been performed.
- No compliance certification is claimed and no validated cryptographic mode is claimed.
The security work is an incomplete implementation of a 192-item checklist.
The itemised status — distinguishing implemented behaviour from pending work —
lives in src/security/SECURITY.md. Read it before
relying on anything security-related.
Implemented and tested:
- Linux 6.18.54-aether4 with nftables, AppArmor, Yama, Landlock, FORTIFY, hardened usercopy, allocation initialisation, IOMMU defaults, zram
- Source-built nftables 1.1.7, stateful IPv4/IPv6 incoming and forwarding default-deny. A firewall reload owns only its own table; other software's nftables tables are preserved.
- PAM login delay and temporary lockout after five failures (two minutes); yescrypt password hashing; new-password quality checks
- sudo with a pseudo-terminal, a five-minute authentication lifetime and private file defaults. Root stays locked.
- Private home and file defaults; bounded persistent journal; no stored core dumps; kernel log, pointer and tracing restrictions; discovery disabled
- Disk-backed swap disabled; compressed RAM swap offered
- Five-minute idle locking, lock-on-resume, minimal nonpersistent clipboard history, removable-media automount disabled
- Source-built cryptsetup/LUKS2 and an interactive x86_64 live installer
- A signed UEFI Secure Boot chain (shim → GRUB → UKI) with authenticated
PK/KEK/db enrollment, a signed live UKI, and an installer that writes only
the signed chain. QEMU/OVMF, VMware Workstation and VirtualBox evidence is
recorded in
docs/secure-boot.md - Source-built restic 0.19.1 with explicit encrypted backup setup, a daily timer, repository consistency checking and restore to a new directory
aether-security-status --text # or open the Aether Security app
aether-firewall status
aether-firewall allow-tcp 8080 # deliberate exposure, on purpose
aether-backup run
aether-backup check
aether-backup snapshots
aether-backup restore SNAPSHOT /new/empty-destinationA normal user may be unable to inspect the active firewall or AppArmor profiles. The tooling reports that as unverified, not as healthy.
Compiling from source with pinned digests protects against accidental drift. It does not prove that every upstream signing key or the complete supply chain was independently authenticated, and it is not a substitute for review.