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Security: TheLord83/CleanFrame-webos

SECURITY.md

Security

This is a hobby project that runs on a rooted TV, and it holds credentials: the Home Assistant token and, if you use it, the MQTT password. Both live in /var/lib/cleanframe/config.json on the TV with mode 0600, and neither is sent back to the browser (GET /api/config returns them empty and only says set).

Reporting a problem

Do not open a public issue for a security problem. The repository's Security tab has Report a vulnerability, which opens a private advisory (direct link). Describe:

  • what you found, and what an attacker could do with it
  • the version (/api/health, or System in the hub)
  • how to reproduce it, if you can

Expect an answer within a few days. This is a one-person project, not a product with an on-call rotation.

What is in scope

  • the hub (web/): its HTTP server, the API, the browser interface
  • the launcher (app/): the app itself and what it does with the hub's API
  • the install scripts (tools/), when they handle data they should not

What is not in scope

Rooting a TV is out of scope. The exploit path in tools/root/ is documented and unsupported, and its security properties belong to the exploit, not to this project. Report those to the Homebrew Channel or the exploit's author.

So is a TV on the open internet. The hub is built for a LAN: it has no user accounts, and requests from the local machine are trusted by design, the same way Glasshouse does it. If you expose it, put a reverse proxy with authentication in front, and think twice before you do.

LG's own services, the Homebrew Channel, Glasshouse and Home Assistant are somebody else's code, and problems in them belong to their maintainers.

What the project already does

  • config.json and the SSAP client key are written with mode 0600
  • the API refuses requests with a foreign Origin header, and only accepts JSON bodies
  • tokens and passwords are returned by neither GET /api/config nor GET /api/backup; both answer with an empty value and a hasToken / hasPassword flag
  • the stored Home Assistant token is only sent to the stored Home Assistant URL, and a redirect is followed only inside that host
  • TLS certificates are verified; CF_HA_CA adds a bundle, CF_HA_TLS_INSECURE=1 is the documented opt-out for a self-signed certificate
  • /api/tv/info reports model, webOS, firmware, board and memory, but not the serial number, the hardware ID or any file path
  • the hub binds to the TV's LAN interface; nothing is sent anywhere else, there is no telemetry and no cloud

There aren't any published security advisories