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Veyr09/README.md

Krystian Banys

Security and infrastructure. I find what is wrong with a system, prove it, fix it, and leave a test behind so the fix cannot quietly regress.

Two habits run through everything here, and they are the ones worth judging the work by:

  • A finding without a reproduction is not a finding. Every issue I report comes with the input that triggers it and the output it produced, not a severity label.
  • A test that cannot fail proves nothing. My suites run the same inputs through the broken code and the fixed code, and assert that the broken one actually breaks.

What is here

security-and-infrastructure-labs — ten small projects, each a real problem built and broken on purpose, then fixed, with the evidence kept.

Memory safety in C Five defects — CWE-787, 193, 122, 416, 134 — reproduced under AddressSanitizer and closed, including one the sanitizer never catches
XXE in Java What DocumentBuilderFactory and XMLInputFactory do out of the box, and the settings that stop it
Multi-tenant isolation One service deployed three ways, probed for cross-tenant reads and session replay
Docker port hardening A container published on every interface, closed and then verified from outside the machine
Flask API review Eight defects found, each proven by a test that attacks both copies
AWS cost from a Terraform plan $1,460.20/month of fixed cost read off a plan, before anything is built
Four data tools CSV validation in Rust, spreadsheet cleanup, a rates sync, a scraper

gitlab-security-research — source-driven review of GitLab's authorization architecture under its public bug bounty program. I mined 400 disclosed reports to find which bug class actually gets paid, then hunted that class in newly shipped code. 21 hypotheses traced through the source to a verdict, and why each one is a dead end.

Working with me

C · Rust · Java · Python · Docker · Terraform · AWS · Linux

Available for fixed-scope work on Upwork — security reviews, container and deployment hardening, memory-safety audits, and cloud cost reviews. You get the findings ordered by what they cost you, the reasoning behind each one, and the commands to re-run it yourself.

Pinned Loading

  1. gitlab-security-research gitlab-security-research Public

    Source-driven security research into GitLab's authorization architecture: methodology, 20 investigated hypotheses, and responsible-disclosure practice.

  2. security-and-infrastructure-labs security-and-infrastructure-labs Public

    Ten runnable labs: memory safety in C, XXE in Java, multi-tenant isolation, Docker port hardening, a Flask API security review, AWS cost from a Terraform plan, and four data tools. Every finding re…

    Python