The security and anonymity of anonbox users is our highest priority. If you discover a security vulnerability, traffic leak, firewall bypass, or privacy issue, please report it responsibly.

Please DO NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, report security issues through one of the following channels:

1. GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting: Use the "Report a vulnerability" button under the Security tab of this repository.
2. Email Disclosure: Send a direct message to the maintainer (plain email is acceptable; no public PGP key is published for this project):
   • Maintainer: Alejandro Azario (aleaz)
   • Repository: https://github.com/aleaz/anonbox

To help us triage and resolve the issue quickly, please provide:

• A clear description of the vulnerability (such as DNS leak, UDP escape, privilege escalation, or bypass of fail-closed rules).
• Step-by-step instructions or proof-of-concept (PoC) scripts to reproduce the issue.
• The environment used for testing (Debian version, architecture x86_64 vs ARM64, Hypervisor UTM / VirtualBox / KVM).
• Any proposed mitigations or fixes if available.

• Acknowledgment: Within 48 hours of report submission.
• Assessment & Confirmation: Within 5 business days.
• Fix & Coordinated Disclosure: We aim to release fixes promptly before public disclosure.

anonbox is a small Debian toolkit (one main script + docs): it quickly turns a standard Debian 12/13 guest VM into a fail-closed Tor workstation for browsing and general use. It is not Tails, Whonix, an amnesic Live OS, or a new anonymous operating system. Value is packaged defaults, hardening, and an audit CLI—not a replacement OS.

• Persistence is intentional. Reuse the guest. Amnesia (RAM-only rootfs) is out of scope. For disposable sessions, revert a hypervisor snapshot.
• Disk encryption is user-provided at Debian install time. anonbox does not set up LUKS/eCryptfs. The script runs without encryption. If you keep data on the VM, enable encryption (recommended). Throwaway / discard-disk / revert-snapshot → optional. anonbox check reports SAFE only when LUKS or eCryptfs is present (otherwise storage FAIL).
• SSH is closed by default (hypervisor console preferred). Optional lab: --allow-ssh accepts inbound TCP/22 from RFC1918 only; the rule is written to /etc/nftables.conf and persists across reboot. Re-running setup/all without --allow-ssh regenerates the firewall without that rule. Prefer NAT + port-forward or host-only—not an open bridged LAN. Lab SSH is not a max-anonymity posture.

Please review docs/THREAT_MODEL.md for established security boundaries:

• In-Scope: Transparent TCP/DNS Tor routing, fail-closed kill-switch, DNS/UDP/ICMP/IPv6 leak prevention, OS hardening, stream isolation.
• Residuals: First apt/git install over clearnet; TransPort/DNSPort bind on NIC IP (mitigated by nft INPUT drop; DHCP drift remediable via anonbox sync-iface / NM dispatcher); MAC cloning under hypervisor NAT is not L2 anti-fingerprint.
• Out-of-Scope (Known Limits): Host machine compromise, physical cold-boot RAM attacks, browser fingerprint standardization (use Tor Browser for web browsing), Whonix-style gateway isolation.