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The shipped etc/hazelcast.xml enables multicast discovery with the
well-known group name/password ("cellar"/"pass") and no SSL,
symmetric-encryption or socket-interceptor. In Hazelcast OSS the
group password is not an authentication mechanism, so any host that
can reach the multicast group can join the cluster and push cluster
events (including bundle installs) to every node.
Add a loud, non-blocking startup warning in HazelcastServiceFactory
when these insecure defaults are detected, add explanatory comments
to the shipped hazelcast.xml, and correct the misleading doc language
that implied the group password is a real credential, with a new
"Security considerations" section covering hardening recommendations.
This does not change any default values (multicast, group name/
password, groups.cfg whitelist) - it only makes the risk visible and
gives operators concrete steps to secure their deployment.
3 tasks
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Summary
The shipped
etc/hazelcast.xmlenables multicast discovery with the well-known groupname/password (
cellar/pass) and no SSL, symmetric-encryption or socket-interceptor. InHazelcast OSS, the group password is not an authentication mechanism - it isn't verified at
join. Combined with
groups.cfgshippingdefault.bundle.whitelist.inbound=*anddefault.bundle.sync=cluster, any host that can reach the multicast group can join thecluster and push a bundle-install cluster event that other nodes will execute.
This PR does not change any default values (multicast, group name/password, or the
groups.cfgwhitelist) - that's a separate, more disruptive discussion. It only makes therisk impossible to miss and gives operators concrete hardening steps:
HazelcastServiceFactorynow logs a loud, non-blockingWARNat startup if the groupname/password are still the shipped defaults, and/or if multicast is enabled with no
SSL/symmetric-encryption/socket-interceptor protecting it.
hazelcast.xmlgets explanatory comments next to the<group>and<multicast>elements.hazelcast.adocno longer implies the group password is a real credential, and gains anew "Security considerations" section with hardening recommendations (network isolation,
tcp-ip with an explicit member list instead of multicast, SSL/symmetric-encryption).
Test plan
mvn -pl hazelcast -am test- all tests pass, including a newHazelcastServiceFactorySecurityTestcovering both detection conditions (default group,unprotected multicast) and their negative cases, plus a regression guard that asserts the
shipped
assembly/src/main/resources/hazelcast.xmlis still detected as insecure today.HazelcastServiceFactoryTest, which spins up a realHazelcastInstance, still passes with the new check wired intobuildInstance().hazelcast.adocchanges for correct AsciiDoc syntax.