Only the latest minor release line receives active security patches and dependency updates.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.1.x |
Yes |
< 0.1.0 |
No |
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, discussions, or pull requests.
Instead, report suspected vulnerabilities privately using one of the following channels:
- GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (Preferred): Navigate to the Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability tab on the repository.
- Direct Maintainer Contact:
Reach out privately via @ardianryan on GitHub with
[SECURITY] OpenVolleyin the subject line.
- Affected version or commit SHA (
v0.1.0,main, etc.). - Step-by-step reproduction instructions or minimal proof-of-concept request/payload.
- Expected impact (e.g., authentication bypass, stored XSS, privilege escalation, DoS).
- Initial acknowledgment: within 72 hours.
- Triage & remediation plan: within 7 business days.
- Coordinated disclosure: credit is awarded in the release notes and GitHub Security Advisory once a patch is published (unless anonymity is requested).
OpenVolley implements defense-in-depth protections out of the box:
- Strict Content-Security-Policy (Zero
'unsafe-inline'Scripts)- Enforced globally by
src/server/middleware/security.ts:script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'. - Pre-paint theme initialization runs from an external static script (
/theme-init.js) so inline scripts remain completely disabled.
- Enforced globally by
- Multi-Layer Anti-XSS Sanitization
src/shared/sanitize.tsstrips<script>blocks, inline event handlers, control bytes, CSS style-breakout strings,javascript:/vbscript:/data:text/htmlURLs, and path traversal sequences on both server write paths and client render components.
- Cryptographic Magic-Byte Upload Verification & Upload Sandboxing
src/server/services/upload.tsinspects raw binary file signatures (PNG,JPEG,WEBP,MP4/MOVISO-BMFFftyp,WebMEBML) rather than trusting clientContent-Typeheaders or file extensions, blocking spoofed SVG/HTML polyglots.- Local fallback uploads under
/uploads/*are served withX-Content-Type-Options: nosniffandContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'; media-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox.
- Authentication, Constant-Time Secrets & RBAC
- Passwords are hashed using
Bun.password.hash(Argon2id). - Session tokens (
ov_token) and Arena TV VIP tokens (ov_tv_vip) useHS256JWTs stored inHttpOnly,SameSite=Laxcookies with automaticSecureflag upgrades behind HTTPS / reverse proxies. - Arena TV PIN comparisons use SHA-256 +
crypto.timingSafeEqual(safeComparePin) to eliminate timing side channels. - Role checks (
admin,panitia,media) are enforced independently on every server mutation route and Back-Office view.
- Passwords are hashed using
- Brute-Force Rate Limiting & SSE Connection Caps
- Sliding-window per-IP rate limiters protect
/api/auth/loginand/api/public/tv-auth(429 Too Many Requests+Retry-After). - Public SSE connections are bounded (
MAX_SSE_CLIENTS) while preserving dedicated capacity for authenticated Arena TV displays.
- Sliding-window per-IP rate limiters protect
- Automated Static Analysis & Dependency Auditing
- GitHub CodeQL (
security-extended+security-and-quality) runs on every push, pull request, and weekly schedule alongside Dependabot updates.
- GitHub CodeQL (
Before running OpenVolley in a live tournament environment:
- Set a cryptographically random
JWT_SECRET(openssl rand -hex 32) in.env. - Change default seeded passwords (
admin,panitia,media) and rotate the default Arena TV PIN (4426). - Terminate TLS (
HTTPS) in front of OpenVolley via Cloudflare Tunnel, Nginx, or Caddy so session cookies automatically receive theSecureattribute. - Keep
.envand./data/outside public web roots and back up./data/openvolley.dbregularly.