Palisade is a security tool, so it is held to a higher bar than the code it scans. If you believe you've found a vulnerability in Palisade itself, thank you - please report it privately.
- Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting - https://github.com/arpankernel/palisade/security/advisories/new
- Please do not open a public issue for suspected vulnerabilities.
Include: the version (palisade-sec --version), a minimal reproducer
(ideally a hostile input file), and the impact you believe it has.
Response targets: acknowledgement within 72 hours; assessment and a fix or mitigation plan within 14 days for confirmed issues. Credit is given in the changelog unless you prefer otherwise.
The scanner's own safety contract - violations of any of these are security bugs, not ordinary bugs:
- SF-1 - code execution: the scanner executing, importing,
execing, orevaling any code or config from a scanned target, ever. (Pure parsing only; enforced by audit-hook tests over a hostile corpus.) - SF-2 - network:
scan/baseline/fixmaking any network call. - SF-3 - filesystem escape: reading outside the scan target (e.g. via
symlinks) or writing anywhere except
.palisade/and explicitly requested output files. - Denial of service: any input file that crashes the scanner, hangs it past its budgets, or exhausts memory instead of being skipped with a warning.
- Data leakage: reports/logs carrying materially more source content than the finding traces are designed to include (single lines, capped at 200 chars).
False negatives/positives in detection are quality issues - please file those as regular GitHub issues with a fixture.
The latest minor release line receives security fixes. Older versions:
please upgrade - pip install -U palisade-sec.
Runtime dependencies are deliberately few (typer, rich, pydantic, pyyaml;
tree-sitter only via the optional [js] extra), pinned via a committed
uv.lock, and releases are built and published from CI-verified commits.
Signed releases + SBOM/provenance are on the roadmap (Phase 4 - Certify).