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Security: astermd/node-checkoutchamp-client

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately. Do not open a public GitHub issue.

Email hello@astermd.com with:

  • a description of the issue and the impact you believe it has,
  • the package version and Node.js version affected,
  • steps to reproduce, ideally a minimal snippet.

We aim to acknowledge a report within 5 business days and to agree a disclosure timeline with you before any public write-up.

You may also use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on https://github.com/astermd/node-checkoutchamp-client/security/advisories/new.

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.0.x Yes

This package is pre-1.0. Security fixes are released against the latest published version only; there are no maintained older branches yet. Pin with ^0.0.1 and expect breaking changes between patch releases until 1.0.

Handling credentials

This package ships no credentials, no defaults and no environment lookups. Your login ID and password are required arguments you pass at construction:

const api = new API(loginId, password, { host: 'api.checkoutchamp.com' });

Read this before you deploy

The Checkout Champ API authenticates with loginId and password sent as URL query string parameters. That is the provider's design, not a choice this package makes, and it has consequences you must plan for:

  • Your account password appears in the URL of every request. Anything that records outbound request URLs — a forward proxy, an egress gateway, an APM agent, a packet capture, a corporate TLS-inspecting appliance — will record the password in cleartext.
  • Audit what sits between your application and the internet before enabling this in production, and confirm none of it logs full request URLs.
  • This package always verifies TLS certificates and offers no switch to disable that. Without verification, credentials in a URL are readable by any on-path attacker.
  • Rotate the password immediately if it is ever committed, captured in a proxy log, pasted into a ticket, or shared outside your team.
  • getPayloadInfo() and the payload key returned by an accessor's true argument exclude only the configured loginId and password — that is the entire guarantee. They otherwise echo back your own parameters verbatim, so on importOrder, preauth and importUpsale the payload is the full cardholder object you supplied, and the same handling this document requires for the URL applies to it too. A password key you put in your own call parameters (as opposed to the configured credential) also survives into this snapshot, even though it never reaches the wire.
  • The header object returned when you pass { headerRequired: true } is not covered by that same guarantee for every field: header.url always has its query string removed, since that is where loginId, password and cardholder data ride, but this trims the query rather than redacting it — scheme, host and path are all that is ever returned there.

Handling sensitive data in logs

Debug logging is off by default. When you turn it on:

  • Entries are redacted by default, and here redaction covers the URL as well as headers and bodies — because this API carries credentials, personal data and cardholder data as query parameters. loginId, password, card numbers, CVV, expiry, bank and government identifiers are masked in the logged URL.
  • The scheme, host and path are still logged verbatim, so you can always see which endpoint was called.
  • A bracket-nested parameter name — the shape a nested object produces on the wire, e.g. card[number], card[cvv], or a doubly-nested a[card][cvv] — is masked using the same leaf/parent logic applied to a JSON body: cvv is sensitive by itself, number only under a card-like parent such as card, and number under an unrelated parent such as order is left visible.
  • Known limitation: redaction inspects one flat level of query parameters. A sensitive value nested inside a percent-encoded URL parameter — for example a redirectUrl whose own query string contains a token — is not decoded and masked recursively. If you add a parameter of that shape to your own integration, keep this in mind before assuming the log is fully masked.
  • URL fragments are masked wholesale: any fragment with content at all becomes #[REDACTED], regardless of what it looks like. A fragment has no defined structure to mask selectively, so the only safe fragment is an empty one.
  • debugRedact: false disables masking entirely and will write your account password and full card numbers to disk. It exists for local debugging. Never enable it in production.
  • Redacted logs are still sensitive. They record which account touched which order, customer and transaction, and when. Store them on encrypted volumes, restrict read access, ship them only to systems cleared for that data, and apply a retention period at least as strict as the rest of your order data.
  • The built-in file sink prunes its own dated files after debugRetentionDays by default (7 days keeps eight calendar dates, inclusive of the oldest edge). If you supply your own debugSink, retention becomes entirely your responsibility.
  • Logging is asynchronous. Await api.flushDebugLog() before a short-lived process exits, or a queued entry can be lost.

Compliance

Using this package does not by itself make your application PCI DSS, HIPAA or GDPR compliant. It is one component in your system. Scoping, encryption at rest, access control, audit logging, breach procedures and your agreements with Checkout Champ and your processors remain your responsibility.

Note in particular that endpoints such as importOrder, preauth and importUpsale transmit cardholder data as query parameters. Determine with your assessor whether that places the systems handling those requests, and any component that logs their URLs, inside your PCI DSS scope.

There aren't any published security advisories