Please report security issues privately. Do not open a public GitHub issue.
Email hello@astermd.com with:
- a description of the issue and the impact you believe it has,
- the package version and Node.js version affected,
- steps to reproduce, ideally a minimal snippet.
We aim to acknowledge a report within 5 business days and to agree a disclosure timeline with you before any public write-up.
You may also use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on https://github.com/astermd/node-checkoutchamp-client/security/advisories/new.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.0.x | Yes |
This package is pre-1.0. Security fixes are released against the latest
published version only; there are no maintained older branches yet. Pin with
^0.0.1 and expect breaking changes between patch releases until 1.0.
This package ships no credentials, no defaults and no environment lookups. Your login ID and password are required arguments you pass at construction:
const api = new API(loginId, password, { host: 'api.checkoutchamp.com' });The Checkout Champ API authenticates with loginId and password sent as
URL query string parameters. That is the provider's design, not a choice
this package makes, and it has consequences you must plan for:
- Your account password appears in the URL of every request. Anything that records outbound request URLs — a forward proxy, an egress gateway, an APM agent, a packet capture, a corporate TLS-inspecting appliance — will record the password in cleartext.
- Audit what sits between your application and the internet before enabling this in production, and confirm none of it logs full request URLs.
- This package always verifies TLS certificates and offers no switch to disable that. Without verification, credentials in a URL are readable by any on-path attacker.
- Rotate the password immediately if it is ever committed, captured in a proxy log, pasted into a ticket, or shared outside your team.
getPayloadInfo()and thepayloadkey returned by an accessor'strueargument exclude only the configuredloginIdandpassword— that is the entire guarantee. They otherwise echo back your own parameters verbatim, so onimportOrder,preauthandimportUpsalethe payload is the full cardholder object you supplied, and the same handling this document requires for the URL applies to it too. Apasswordkey you put in your own call parameters (as opposed to the configured credential) also survives into this snapshot, even though it never reaches the wire.- The
headerobject returned when you pass{ headerRequired: true }is not covered by that same guarantee for every field:header.urlalways has its query string removed, since that is whereloginId,passwordand cardholder data ride, but this trims the query rather than redacting it — scheme, host and path are all that is ever returned there.
Debug logging is off by default. When you turn it on:
- Entries are redacted by default, and here redaction covers the URL
as well as headers and bodies — because this API carries credentials,
personal data and cardholder data as query parameters.
loginId,password, card numbers, CVV, expiry, bank and government identifiers are masked in the logged URL. - The scheme, host and path are still logged verbatim, so you can always see which endpoint was called.
- A bracket-nested parameter name — the shape a nested object produces on the
wire, e.g.
card[number],card[cvv], or a doubly-nesteda[card][cvv]— is masked using the same leaf/parent logic applied to a JSON body:cvvis sensitive by itself,numberonly under a card-like parent such ascard, andnumberunder an unrelated parent such asorderis left visible. - Known limitation: redaction inspects one flat level of query
parameters. A sensitive value nested inside a percent-encoded URL parameter
— for example a
redirectUrlwhose own query string contains atoken— is not decoded and masked recursively. If you add a parameter of that shape to your own integration, keep this in mind before assuming the log is fully masked. - URL fragments are masked wholesale: any fragment with content at all becomes
#[REDACTED], regardless of what it looks like. A fragment has no defined structure to mask selectively, so the only safe fragment is an empty one. debugRedact: falsedisables masking entirely and will write your account password and full card numbers to disk. It exists for local debugging. Never enable it in production.- Redacted logs are still sensitive. They record which account touched which order, customer and transaction, and when. Store them on encrypted volumes, restrict read access, ship them only to systems cleared for that data, and apply a retention period at least as strict as the rest of your order data.
- The built-in file sink prunes its own dated files after
debugRetentionDaysby default (7 days keeps eight calendar dates, inclusive of the oldest edge). If you supply your owndebugSink, retention becomes entirely your responsibility. - Logging is asynchronous. Await
api.flushDebugLog()before a short-lived process exits, or a queued entry can be lost.
Using this package does not by itself make your application PCI DSS, HIPAA or GDPR compliant. It is one component in your system. Scoping, encryption at rest, access control, audit logging, breach procedures and your agreements with Checkout Champ and your processors remain your responsibility.
Note in particular that endpoints such as importOrder, preauth and
importUpsale transmit cardholder data as query parameters. Determine with
your assessor whether that places the systems handling those requests, and any
component that logs their URLs, inside your PCI DSS scope.