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fix(network): classify NAT64/6to4 by embedded IPv4 and block reserved ranges - #2574
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… ranges is_private_ip let 64:ff9b::/96 and 2002::/16 addresses through even when they embed loopback, RFC1918 or link-local v4, and missed 0.0.0.0/8, 192.0.0.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, multicast, 240.0.0.0/4, Teredo, site-local and v6 multicast. An allowlisted host with attacker DNS could reach internal services via these forms. Adds TM-NET-029.
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Requested by Михайло · project thread
What changed
The SSRF guard (
is_private_ip, used before the request and in the connect-time resolver) now:64:ff9b::/96) and 6to4 (2002::/16) addresses by the IPv4 address they carry;0.0.0.0/8,192.0.0.0/24,198.18.0.0/15,224.0.0.0/4,240.0.0.0/4(incl. broadcast), and v6100::/64, Teredo2001::/32, local-use NAT6464:ff9b:1::/48, site-localfec0::/10, multicastff00::/8.Documentation ranges (
192.0.2.0/24,198.51.100.0/24,203.0.113.0/24,2001:db8::/32) stay allowed, since they are unroutable and tests use them as public stand-ins.Why
An allowlisted hostname with attacker-controlled DNS could return
64:ff9b::a9fe:a9feor2002:7f00:1::. On a NAT64 network, or through a 6to4 relay, those reach cloud metadata or loopback while passing the v4 checks. Spotted while comparing against shipfastlabs/bashbox, which already handles these forms. New threat entry TM-NET-029.Before / After
Before: the 4 new unit tests fail (
test_is_private_ip_nat64_embeds_v4,_6to4_embeds_v4,_reserved_v4_ranges,_reserved_v6_ranges).After:
cargo test -p bashkit --lib --features http_client network::gives 58 passed, 0 failed.Risk
198.18/15) or Teredo addresses can no longer be reached. None of these are legitimate HTTP targets.Checklist