fix(deps): clear the 2026-10-14 wasmtime and rustls advisories

[chaliy]

What changed

The advisory scan passes again. wasmtime moves =48.0.5 -> =48.0.6 and rustls moves 0.23.45 -> 0.23.46, across all three cargo lockfiles (root, crates/bashkit/fuzz, examples/hyperlight/host).

No API or behavior change in this repo: both are drop-in patch releases on the lines already in use. 48.0.6 keeps MSRV at 1.95.0, matching rust-toolchain.toml, so the exact pin's reason for existing is unchanged and the dependabot ignore entries stay as they are. 49.0.3 carries the same wasmtime fixes but needs rustc 1.96, which is the gap that reddened #2708. The wasmtime bump needs no CPython guest rebuild — build.rs recompiles the .cwasm.

Why

Nightly run 263 went red on the Advisory Audit: 15 vulnerabilities in the root and fuzz lockfiles, 11 in examples/hyperlight/host. Nothing in the tree changed — two upstream batches landed on 2026-10-14.

Eleven against wasmtime 48.0.5 (RUSTSEC-2026-0353..-0359, -0361..-0364): host panics reachable from guest code, exception tags that can leave host data structures unaligned, and a component-model handle table capped only per instance and charged to no limit.

Four against rustls 0.23.45 (RUSTSEC-2026-0346..-0349): Debug impls on client session values exposing TLS secrets, buffered application data sent to the outer server after ECH rejection, Brotli certificate decompression allocating up to 1 GiB before authentication, and an unauthenticated ServerHello downgrading later connections to classical key exchange.

Before / After

./scripts/audit-lockfiles.sh — the same script the nightly advisories job and the CI audit job both call.

Before:

::group::cargo audit ./Cargo.lock
    Scanning ./Cargo.lock for vulnerabilities (680 crate dependencies)
Crate:     wasmtime
Version:   48.0.5
Title:     Component-model handle tables are capped only per instance and charged to no limit
ID:        RUSTSEC-2026-0363
Severity:  6.2 (medium)
Solution:  Upgrade to >=36.0.18, <37.0.0 OR >=48.0.6, <49.0.0 OR >=49.0.3
...
error: 15 vulnerabilities found!
::group::cargo audit ./crates/bashkit/fuzz/Cargo.lock
error: 15 vulnerabilities found!
::group::cargo audit ./examples/hyperlight/host/Cargo.lock
error: 11 vulnerabilities found!
##[error]Process completed with exit code 1.

After:

::group::cargo audit ./Cargo.lock
    Scanning ./Cargo.lock for vulnerabilities (680 crate dependencies)
Crate:     atomic-polyfill
Version:   1.0.3
Warning:   unmaintained
ID:        RUSTSEC-2023-0089

warning: 1 allowed warning found
::group::cargo audit ./crates/bashkit/fuzz/Cargo.lock
    Scanning ./crates/bashkit/fuzz/Cargo.lock for vulnerabilities (267 crate dependencies)
::group::cargo audit ./examples/hyperlight/host/Cargo.lock
    Scanning ./examples/hyperlight/host/Cargo.lock for vulnerabilities (118 crate dependencies)
...
AUDIT_EXIT=0

The one remaining line is the pre-existing allowed atomic-polyfill unmaintained warning.

Confirmed end to end after merge: Nightly run 264 on b6e712a is green on all four jobs, including the Advisory Audit that failed in run 263.

Supply chain

cargo vet --locked exits 0. wasmtime 48.0.6 is covered by the existing bytecodealliance trusted-publisher wildcard, so only imports.lock refreshes. rustls 0.23.46 needed a hand delta audit, recorded in supply-chain/audits.toml after reading the diff.

Every change in that delta narrows:

• the TLS 1.3 key-exchange hint moves out of handle_server_hello into ExpectFinished, so it is recorded only after cert_verified and sig_verified rather than from an unauthenticated ServerHello;
• start_traffic moves after the ECH-rejection check, and the std writer/flush paths return the connection's stored fatal error instead of buffering plaintext, so application data cannot reach the outer server after ECH rejection;
• Brotli decompression switches to BrotliDecompressStream over the caller's output slice with BrotliState::new_strict, rejecting large windows and trailing input instead of letting brotli::BrotliDecompress allocate; zlib switches to Inflate so total_in/total_out are checked against both slice lengths;
• the secret-bearing Debug derives become hand impls that destructure and skip secret/master_secret, with finish_non_exhaustive and upstream tests asserting the key bytes are absent.

No unsafe added or changed, no new filesystem/network/process/environment access, no new dependencies, build.rs unchanged.

Risk

• Low
• Two patch-level dependency bumps with no API change on our side. The residual risk is an upstream regression inside the patch releases themselves; both are the vendors' own advisory-fix releases. Staying on 48.0.5/0.23.45 is the larger risk, and the MSRV reason for the exact pin is preserved rather than worked around.

Checklist

• Tests added or updated — no new behavior to test here; the regression gate is scripts/audit-lockfiles.sh, which was already failing and now passes. The 162 repository-script tests (including test_dependabot_coverage.py, whose pin references move with the bump) pass.
• Backward compatibility considered — no public API or behavior change.

Validated locally: ./scripts/audit-lockfiles.sh (exit 0), cargo vet --locked (exit 0), cargo deny check licenses sources, cargo check -p bashkit --features cpython on 48.0.6, just check (fmt, clippy --all-targets -D warnings, cargo test, 162 script tests, all parity gates).

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Status	Name	Latest Commit	Preview URL	Updated (UTC)
✅ Deployment successful! View logs	bashkit	cfdc433	Commit Preview URL Branch Preview URL	Oct 15 2026, 09:20 AM