The React SPA reads and writes everything through the control plane in server/, via services/apiClient.ts. Anything in the browser is under the user's control, so the client is never a security boundary.
| Measure |
Detail |
| No secrets in the bundle |
Nothing is injected through Vite define, which substitutes text literally into the public JS. |
| No third-party scripts |
React, charts and Tailwind are bundled from npm. A production Content-Security-Policy is injected at build time (vite.config.ts, config/csp.ts). |
| Input checks |
Proxy targets are restricted to http(s) URLs and reject cloud-metadata and link-local hosts; domains and server IPs are format-checked (utils/validation.ts). These advise; the server decides. |
| Permission gating |
The UI hides actions outside the effective permissions /api/whoami reports, as a usability aid. |
| Credentials in the browser |
An API key is held in sessionStorage and sent without cookies. A passkey session is an HttpOnly cookie script cannot read; its CSRF token is held in memory and recovered from /api/auth/session after a reload. |
| Theme CSS |
Only --color-* keys with #hex values from stored themes are applied (contexts/ThemeContext.tsx). |
| Uploads |
Avatars and logos reject SVG and oversized files and are re-encoded through a canvas (utils/imageFile.ts). |
| Concern |
Control |
| Authentication |
API keys (X-Api-Key or Bearer) stored as PBKDF2-SHA256 hashes with a per-key salt and a server pepper, verified in constant time, revocable, expiring within 365 days, limited to chosen permissions. Passkeys (WebAuthn, user verification required) start cookie sessions stored as SHA-256 hashes, rechecked on every request, with an Origin check and a CSRF token on unsafe methods. Optional mutual TLS pinned to client-certificate thumbprints. |
| Authorization |
Deny-by-default policies map roles to permissions on every endpoint (server/src/SslReverseProxy.Core/Security/Permissions.cs). A key's scopes intersect its owner's current role on every request; a key issues only keys within its own permissions, and a scoped key cannot add passkeys. |
| Secret custody |
Certificates are issued and renewed by Caddy (ACME). The pepper, the Cloudflare token, alert target URLs and tokens, and TLS material come from configuration, user-secrets or the environment, never source, and the API never returns them. The browser stores none of them. |
| SSRF |
ProxyTargetValidator re-validates every upstream and sign-in verifier before config reaches the proxy: http(s) only, cloud-metadata and link-local blocked, private and loopback gated by policy, applied to every address a host name resolves to; localhost and *.localhost are loopback. Health probes check each address again at connect time, dial only those, and follow no redirects. |
| Headers |
SecurityHeadersMiddleware sends a JSON-only CSP and hardening headers on every response; HSTS and HTTPS redirect in Production. |