Human-friendly Identity & Data Encryption. The goal is to encrypt to a person, not to a key. This repository implements the file format engine for post-quantum file encryption, a hybrid signature scheme, and the machinery an identity needs to outlive a single key: device enrollment and revocation, forward security by erasure, an auditable history, and group messaging over MLS.
HIDE is end-to-end encryption for files and short messages whose key encapsulation is designed to resist quantum attacks: every content key is wrapped with X-Wing, a hybrid of X25519 and ML-KEM-768 as standardised in NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), and every signature is a hybrid of Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 from FIPS 204 (ML-DSA). A break of either half alone is not enough.
HIDE is experimental and unaudited. Do not use this for sensitive data. The wire format is a release candidate, not 1.0; no third party has reviewed the code, and the hybrid KEM tracks an IETF draft. The crates it depends on are not audited either: the READMEs of
ml-kem,ml-dsaandx-wingeach say the implementation "has never been independently audited", and thehpkeREADME says "nobody has performed a paid audit of this crate" (it records one internal review, by Cloudflare, of version 0.8).
Every claim below was produced by a command in this repository, on Rust 1.99.0 (toolchain
stable; the minimum supported Rust version is 1.88).
- Encrypt/decrypt round-trips across chunk boundaries (0 B, 1 B, 64 KiB ± 1, multi-chunk).
- One payload, many recipients: the file is encrypted once; only the content key is wrapped per recipient.
- Tamper detection: flipping every byte position of the frozen vector
hello.hidemakes decryption fail (cargo test -p hide-object --test vectors), and property tests extend that to random single-byte mutations of random containers. - Truncation, chunk reordering, duplication, deletion and trailing bytes are all rejected.
- Thirty-three frozen rejection vectors (
conformance/vectors/rejections/) — among them bad magic, minor 0, an unknown preamble flag, header-length overflow, flipped header and FINAL bits, truncation before FINAL, trailing bytes, a stripped or unexpected signature, a recipient who re-MACed a changed extension or removed an unknown stanza, critical header and metadata keys, oversize extensions, a small-order or non-canonically encoded recipient key, a key file demanding 2.4 GiB of Argon2 memory — are refused by both the Rust crates and the independent Node implementation, so the two agree on what is invalid, not only on what is valid. - Forward compatibility is tested, not promised: the GREASE vectors (
grease.hide,grease-signed.hide,grease-minor.hide) carry an unknown recipient stanza, ignorable header and metadata extensions and a future minor, and must open.conformance/vectors/manifest.jsonlists all 86 vectors with expected outcome and SHA-256 (conformance/vectors/README.md). - Fuzzed: eleven libFuzzer targets under
fuzz/(format_header,object_open,keyring_open,identity_log,epoch_chain,transparency_proofs,challenge_decode,mls_message,epoch_store,checkpoint_note,identity_bindings) run 45 seconds each in CI on every push and four hours each nightly with a corpus carried forward. The nightly workflow opens an issue when a target fails. Two nightly jobs in October 2026 (identity_logon the 5th,object_openon the 21st) lost their hosted runner before any step ran, so they left no reproducer and no issue; the list of workflow runs, not the issue list, is the complete record. unsafe_code = "forbid"in every crate excepthide-ffi, where the C ABI needs it; 473 tests (cargo test --workspace --all-features).- Independent interoperability: a separate Node implementation (
@hpke/hybridkem-x-wing,cbor, Nodecrypto) decrypts the Rust vectors (node conformance/node/verify.mjs), and the differential run (node conformance/differential/run.mjs) feeds Node-built and Node-mutated containers to the Rust reader on every CI run and fails on any accept/reject disagreement. - Cross-OS: the full suite runs on Linux, Windows and macOS in CI (
ubuntu-24.04,windows-2025,macos-15), and the same frozen vector files must open on all three. That is the cross-OS check; no test moves a container produced on one system to another. - Relying-party structures (0.9.1): recovery binding, epoch binding and C2SP signed
checkpoints with a distinct-witness cosignature threshold verify in Rust, the C ABI, WASM and
every SDK (
cargo test -p hide-identity --test bindings,cargo test -p hide-transparency --test checkpoint,node conformance/node/subsystems.mjs). - Degenerate recipient keys are refused: an X25519 component of small order would silently remove the classical half of the hybrid, so all seven such points are rejected before use.
- Property tests (
proptest) assert the parser never panics on arbitrary input, that any single-byte mutation of a container fails to decrypt, and that truncation or appended bytes always fail. - Hybrid signatures: Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, concatenated; a signature verifies only if both halves do, so neither a quantum nor a classical break of one is enough.
- Signatures cross surfaces: a signature made in WASM verifies in Node and vice versa, and
every surface in the cross-surface matrix (WASM, Node, the CLI, Python, Go, Java, Ruby, PHP and
.NET) opens what every other surface produced (
node conformance/cross-surface/verify.mjs, withHIDE_CROSS_REQUIREnaming the runtimes CI must not skip). - OpenSSH accepted our agent:
ssh-add -llisted the key,ssh-keygen -Y signobtained a signature through it, andssh-keygen -Y verifyreported it good. That was verified by hand with OpenSSH's own tools on 0.5.0 and is recorded indocs/tracker.csv(P4.2, P4.5, P4.8); it is not re-run by CI. The agent's wire framing is unit-tested inapps/hide-cli/src/agent.rs. - Replay is refused: a challenge answer is accepted once; presenting the identical valid signature again is rejected, as is one given for a different audience or after its expiry.
- Revocation means something: an identity is a hash-linked log of device events, and authority is evaluated at the point in the log where an entry appears rather than against the final state. A revoked device cannot re-enrol itself, cannot revoke the device that removed it, and cannot rewrite anything after its removal. Only an offline recovery key can replace the device set.
- Forward security by erasure: keys are grouped into epochs, and destroying an epoch's secret makes every container written to it unreadable — including by the intended recipient. Epoch secrets are independent random keys, not derived from a master seed, because a derived chain would let anyone holding the seed reconstruct what was supposedly erased.
- A rewritten history is detectable: the transparency log answers RFC 6962 inclusion and consistency proofs, swept over every size from 1 to 33 and every index. A log that alters or drops an entry it already published cannot produce a consistency proof against the root it published before.
- Group messages survive revocation: MLS proves a message came from a group member, but not that
the member's device is still trusted.
accept_from_trustedrefuses a message from a device the identity revoked, even though MLS itself considers it a valid member.
One run, release build, 256 MiB payload, on 2026-11-11 (Windows 11, x86-64, Rust 1.99.0, a workstation that was busy with other builds at the time):
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Encrypt / decrypt (in memory) | 217 / 102 MiB/s |
hide.exe, release build |
1,922,048 bytes |
hide-v0.9.1-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip (release asset) |
794,614 bytes |
These are single measurements on a machine that was doing other work, not a benchmark; your CPU and OS will give different numbers. Earlier versions of this README quoted higher throughput, a 675 KB executable and a 7 MB peak RSS; no command output was recorded for those figures, so they have been removed. Peak memory is not measured by any command in this repository.
Streaming reuses two fixed 64 KiB buffers and one expanded AEAD instance, so there is no per-chunk
allocation or rekeying; that is a property of the code (hide-object), reviewed rather than
asserted by a test. It applies to unsigned encryption: signed encryption commits to
SHA-256(plaintext), so it buffers the plaintext and is capped at 1 GiB. The format adds a header
(dominated by the 1120-byte hybrid encapsulation per recipient) and 21 bytes per 64 KiB record.
Reproduce with: cargo run --release -p hide-object --example throughput (prints throughput
and the size overhead) and cargo build --release -p hide-cli (the executable is
target/release/hide or hide.exe).
Checked on 2026-11-11; sources for the cells about other projects are listed under the table.
| HIDE | age | GPG | libsodium sealed box | Signal / MLS | AWS KMS envelope | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-quantum KEM | X-Wing (X25519 + ML-KEM-768), always | Yes, opt-in: age-keygen -pq gives ML-KEM-768 + X25519 since v1.3.0 |
GnuPG 2.5 and later: Kyber (ML-KEM) encryption keys. Separately, RFC 9980 defines post-quantum algorithms for OpenPGP | No (X25519) | Signal: PQXDH; MLS: PQ suites are a draft | ML-KEM in TLS to the service; envelope key is AES |
| Multi-device identity | Signed device log with revocation; no directory | No — one key per recipient | Keyring, subkeys, web of trust | No — a key is a key | Yes, service-operated directory | IAM principals, not people |
| Forward secrecy | By erasure of epoch keys, no ratchet | No | No | No | Yes, double ratchet / tree ratchet | Rotation policy on the master key |
| Signatures | Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 hybrid | No (integrity only) | Yes, classical | Separate crypto_sign, Ed25519 |
Implicit via ratchet authentication | Separate KMS sign API |
| Streaming large files | Yes, 64 KiB chunks, constant memory (unsigned) | Yes, 64 KiB STREAM | Yes | No — one message in memory | Attachments handled by the app | Application concern |
| Third-party audit | None | See the project; no public audit report located as of 2026-11-11 | Long public review history | Yes (Cryptography Engineering, 2017, sponsored by Private Internet Access) | Yes (multiple) | Vendor-attested |
Sources: age v1.3.0 release notes (post-quantum recipients, https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/releases/tag/v1.3.0); GnuPG 2.5.16 announcement (2.5 declared stable, Kyber "aka ML-KEM or FIPS-203" as PQC encryption algorithm, https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2025q4/000500.html); RFC 9980, Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9980); libsodium audit by Dr. Matthew Green of Cryptography Engineering, sponsored by Private Internet Access (https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/libsodium-audit-results/). The remaining cells about other projects are the maintainer's reading of their public documentation and are not individually sourced here.
age and libsodium are far more widely deployed and reviewed than HIDE, and age has offered a
hybrid post-quantum recipient type since v1.3.0. If what you need is post-quantum file encryption
to a key, use age: HIDE is unaudited and has no deployment history. An earlier version of
this README said age had a Trail of Bits audit with findings fixed in August 2026. No source for
that was found (the age v1.3.2 release notes of 2026-08-29,
https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/releases/tag/v1.3.2, say only "a wide range of fixes and
hardening improvements"), so the statement is withdrawn. What HIDE adds on top is a signed
multi-device identity with revocation, hybrid signatures on containers, forward security by epoch
erasure, a transparency-log primitive and MLS group binding, all under one format. Detail in
docs/comparison.md.
Being explicit here matters more than the feature list.
- No directory, and no key-transparency service. The RFC 6962 log primitive exists, but no one operates a log, so recipients are still raw key files that you must exchange over a channel you already trust. Nothing proves a key belongs to a particular person.
- Sender authentication only when the container is signed. For an unsigned container, a successful decryption proves it was not altered; it does not prove who created it. A signed container binds a signing key to the recipient set, the metadata and the exact plaintext — but it attests to a key, and nothing yet proves that key belongs to a particular person.
- Forward secrecy is by erasure, not by ratchet. It exists only if the holder actually destroys the epoch secret; anyone who later obtains a secret that was not erased can decrypt every container captured under it. Device revocation cannot retroactively protect data an attacker already holds.
- No hardware protection. Secret keys are sealed with a passphrase (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305),
but there is no Keychain, TPM, Secure Enclave or Keystore integration, and
--insecure-plaintextstill writes an unencrypted key on request. - Recipient privacy is limited. Stanzas carry no identifiers, but the recipient count and the ciphertext size are visible, and metadata is encrypted rather than hidden. A public signature also reveals the signer's key to anyone holding the file; the confidential placement avoids this.
- Signing is not streaming. A signature commits to the plaintext, so signing buffers the payload.
- SSH authentication is not post-quantum.
hide agentoffers the Ed25519 half of an identity and nothing more. OpenSSH 10.6 (2026-10-06) enables a hybrid post-quantum signature algorithm,ssh-mldsa44-ed25519(https://www.openssh.org/txt/release-10.6), but HIDE signs with ML-DSA-65 and exports an Ed25519 SSH key only, so it does not produce such keys. What this buys is one sealed identity instead of a plaintext private key sitting in~/.ssh, not quantum resistance. - An agent is a signing oracle. Anything that can reach the endpoint can ask for a signature.
That is why confirmation is the default and
--no-confirmmust be asked for. On Unix the socket sits in a directory only the user can enter; on Windows the named pipe is not restricted to the current user, so--no-confirmis refused there. - Group messaging is not post-quantum.
hide-mlsuses X25519, because MLS's post-quantum ciphersuites are still an Internet-Draft (as of 2026-11) and HIDE has not adopted an implementation of them. Object encryption is hybrid post-quantum, so a group message and a sealed file are protected differently. The API states this inPQ_STATUSrather than letting the file format imply uniform protection. mls-rsis unaudited too, like everything else here: its README says it "has not yet received a full security audit by a 3rd party".- A transparency log cannot detect a split view by itself. Two divergent logs are each internally
consistent; catching that needs independent witnesses who gossip roots and refuse to sign two roots
for one size. Witness cosignatures on a checkpoint are verified (
spec/hide-1.md§16.2), but no one operates a log or a witness, so the log is a promise rather than a proof. - Epoch erasure is only as strong as the storage underneath.
hide epoch-init --store,epoch-advanceandepoch-erasekeep epoch secrets in one passphrase-sealed store, and erasing an epoch reseals the store without it. An older copy of that file — a backup, a filesystem snapshot, an SSD's remapped blocks — still holds the epochs it held, for whoever also has the passphrase. - Revocation is deliberately not retroactive. Entries signed before a device was revoked stay valid, because invalidating them would invalidate every message that device ever sent. Revoking a device also does not evict it from MLS groups automatically; that is a separate, explicit call.
- An identity still is not a person. The log proves which devices an identity trusts over time. It does not prove that identity belongs to a particular human, and there is no directory to ask.
- The MLS credential binding was introduced in 0.7.0 and has been exercised only by this repository's own tests; no other implementation has parsed it.
- The installers are not code-signed. No Authenticode or Apple Developer ID signature is applied by the release workflow, so the operating system may warn about or block an unknown publisher. See "Download" for what can be checked instead.
Releases carry three kinds of build. The installers and executables are not code-signed, so Windows or macOS may warn that the publisher is unknown. Verify any download before running it:
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
gh attestation verify <file> --repo hide-protocol/hide
The first compares the file with the checksum list published in the same release (on Windows
without sha256sum, compare the output of Get-FileHash <file> with the line in SHA256SUMS).
The second checks the build-provenance attestation, which shows the file was built by this
repository's release workflow; it needs the GitHub CLI. Neither says anything about whether the
code is correct.
| Build | File | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
| Desktop application | HIDE_*-setup.exe, *.dmg, *.deb, *.AppImage |
You want a window, not a terminal. |
| Portable | hide-portable-* |
You want one executable, no installation, keys kept beside it. |
| Command line | hide-* |
You want to script it. |
The portable build keeps its keys in a hide-keys directory next to the executable, so it runs
from a USB stick. Only the key folder is redirected: the system webview that draws the window may
still keep its own data (cache, settings) in your user profile.
The CLI is built for Linux (x86-64, ARM64, and a static musl build for Alpine and scratch containers), Windows (x86-64, ARM64) and macOS (Apple silicon, Intel).
With a Rust toolchain (1.88 or later), cargo install hide-cli builds the same hide binary
from crates.io.
Templates for Homebrew, Scoop, WinGet and the AUR live in packaging/. The
committed files carry placeholder hashes; the release workflow runs packaging/generate.sh to
fill in the checksums of that release and uploads the result as a workflow artifact named
packaging-manifests. None is published to a package manager: putting an unaudited encryption
tool in a default package manager reaches people who will not read the warnings, so that step is
taken deliberately rather than automatically.
Every binding calls the same Rust core through one C ABI (crates/hide-ffi).
No language reimplements the cryptography, so there is a single implementation to review, and
conformance/cross-surface checks that what one surface produces
every other surface can open, for WASM, Node, the CLI, Python, Go, Java, Ruby, PHP and .NET.
| Language | Path | How it binds |
|---|---|---|
| C / C++ | crates/hide-ffi/include/hide.h |
The ABI itself |
| Python | sdk/python |
ctypes, so a wheel needs no compiler |
| TypeScript / Node | sdk/node |
koffi over the same shared library |
| Browser | sdk/wasm |
WebAssembly, compiled from the same crates |
| Go | sdk/go |
cgo |
| Java / Kotlin | sdk/java |
Foreign Function & Memory API, no JNI shim |
| Ruby | sdk/ruby |
stdlib fiddle, no native gem to build |
| PHP | sdk/php |
ext-ffi |
| .NET / C# | sdk/dotnet |
Source-generated LibraryImport |
pip install hide-protocol
npm install hide-protocol
gem install hide-protocol
dotnet add package HideProtocol
npm install @hide-protocol/wasm # browser
cargo install hide-cli # the command-line tool, built from source
The npm, RubyGems and NuGet packages carry the compiled core for seven targets —
x86-64 and ARM64 Linux (glibc), x86-64 Linux (musl), x86-64 and ARM64 Windows,
and Apple silicon and Intel macOS — so they need no Rust toolchain. PyPI has
wheels for three platforms: manylinux_2_28_x86_64, win_amd64 and
macosx_11_0_arm64; on any other platform, build the core yourself as
sdk/python/README.md describes. The WASM package is
compiled from the same crates.
Go is clone-and-build: go get github.com/hide-protocol/hide/sdk/go alone does
not give a package that compiles, because the C header and the static library
that cgo links are not committed to the module. Clone the repository, build
the core and copy both into place as sdk/go/README.md
describes.
Java (org.hide-protocol:hide) is not yet on Maven Central and PHP
(hide-protocol/hide) is not yet on Packagist: build both from source. Neither
ships a binary: build it with cargo build --release -p hide-ffi and point
HIDE_LIBRARY (Java also accepts -Dhide.library=) at the result, with
HIDE_ALLOW_LIBRARY_OVERRIDE=1 set as well. The same pair overrides the bundled
library everywhere; it is a development-only override, since it replaces the
entire cryptographic core, which is why the second variable is required.
Secret keys never cross into the host language: each SDK holds an opaque handle, and there is deliberately no function that exports key material.
import hide_protocol as hide
with hide.SecretKey.generate() as secret:
box = hide.encrypt(b"hello", [secret.public_key()])
assert hide.decrypt(box, secret).data == b"hello"A browser is a weaker place to hold a key than a desktop: any script on the page shares the heap, so an XSS bug is equivalent to key theft. Prefer the CLI or the desktop application for keys that matter.
cargo test --workspace --all-features
# A key pair. The secret is sealed with a passphrase unless you opt out.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental keygen --secret alice.hide-key --public alice.hide-pub
# Files.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental encrypt report.pdf --recipient alice.hide-pub --output report.pdf.hide
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental open report.pdf.hide --secret alice.hide-key --output report.pdf
# Sign as you encrypt. The signature is readable only by the recipients unless
# you pass --public-signature.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental encrypt report.pdf --recipient alice.hide-pub --output report.pdf.hide --sign alice.hide-key
# Or sign a file in place, leaving report.pdf.hide-sig beside it.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental sign report.pdf --secret alice.hide-key
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental verify report.pdf --signer alice.hide-pub.sign
# Text messages, as a block you can paste into email or chat.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental seal "meet at six" --recipient alice.hide-pub
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental unseal message.txt --secret alice.hide-key
# What is this file? Answered without decrypting it.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental info report.pdf.hide
# Print a public key as text you can paste into email or chat.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental share alice.hide-pub
# Change the passphrase that seals a key file.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental passwd --secret alice.hide-keyThe CLI never overwrites an existing file when it writes a container, a plaintext, a key or a new
identity log; it writes plaintext to private staging first and publishes the result only after
authentication succeeds. Files that grow or change by design are replaced in place: an identity
log on enrol, revoke and recover, an epoch store on advance and erase, and a key file on passwd.
--experimental is mandatory, so the risk is acknowledged explicitly.
keygen writes three files: one secret master seed, and two shareable public keys — alice.hide-pub
for encryption and alice.hide-pub.sign for checking signatures. Both derive from the master seed, so
there is a single thing to back up, and neither can be computed from the other. A key file created
before signatures existed still decrypts; signing with it fails and says so.
A signature proves possession of a key. HIDE has no directory, so nothing ties that key to a person — compare a signer's key against one you already trust.
A key is a thing you lose. An identity is a log of device events, each signed by a device the log already trusted, so it can survive losing one.
# The founding device, plus an offline recovery key kept somewhere else entirely.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental identity-create --secret laptop.hide-key `
--recovery recovery.hide-pub.sign --label laptop --output alice.hide-log
# Add a phone. Signed by the laptop, because only a trusted device may enrol another.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental identity-enrol --log alice.hide-log `
--secret laptop.hide-key --device phone.hide-pub.sign --label phone `
--recovery recovery.hide-pub.sign
# The phone is stolen.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental identity-revoke --log alice.hide-log `
--secret laptop.hide-key --device phone.hide-pub.sign --recovery recovery.hide-pub.sign
# Anyone can replay the log and see who is trusted now. No secret required.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental identity-show --log alice.hide-log `
--recovery recovery.hide-pub.signThe log is public and append-only: verifying it needs no secret, which is what lets someone else check which devices you trust. Revocation applies from the point it appears — the revoked phone cannot re-enrol itself or revoke the laptop, but containers it already holds stay readable to it, and signatures it made while trusted stay valid. Nothing can reach back and change that.
If every device is lost, the offline recovery key replaces the whole device set, with
hide identity-recover (from 0.10.0; hide identity-recover --help lists its arguments). It is
the only key that can, which is why it belongs somewhere that is not a computer.
An epoch chain is a public history of rotating encryption keys. The matching secrets sit in one passphrase-sealed store, and erasing an epoch's secret makes every container encrypted to that epoch unreadable, including to you.
# A public chain to publish, and a sealed store to keep.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental epoch-init --output alice.hide-epochs --store alice.hide-epoch-store
# A sender encrypts to the current epoch's public key.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental epoch-public --chain alice.hide-epochs --output epoch.hide-pub
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental encrypt notes.txt --recipient epoch.hide-pub --output notes.txt.hide
# The holder opens it with the store, which tries every epoch secret it still has.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental open notes.txt.hide --epoch-store alice.hide-epoch-store --output notes.txt
# Start a new epoch, then erase the old one (epoch numbers are shown by epoch-show).
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental epoch-advance --chain alice.hide-epochs --store alice.hide-epoch-store
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental epoch-show --chain alice.hide-epochs
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental epoch-erase 0 --chain alice.hide-epochs --store alice.hide-epoch-storeErasure is only as strong as the storage underneath: an older copy of the store (a backup, a snapshot) still holds the epochs it held. The file names above are examples; the CLI does not require any particular extension.
The same identity can act as an ssh-agent, so the key that authenticates you is never written to disk in the clear.
# Print the public line to paste into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys or github.com/settings/keys.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental ssh-key --secret alice.hide-key
# Serve it. Every signature asks for confirmation. On Unix, --no-confirm turns
# that off; on Windows the flag is refused, because the pipe is not restricted
# to the current user.
cargo run -p hide-cli -- --experimental agent --secret alice.hide-keyThen point SSH at it with SSH_AUTH_SOCK — the socket path on Unix, the pipe
path on Windows ($env:SSH_AUTH_SOCK = '\\.\pipe\hide-agent'). OpenSSH for
Windows 9.5p2 ignores -o IdentityAgent, so use the environment variable on
both platforms.
This offers the Ed25519 half of the identity only. HIDE's post-quantum half is ML-DSA-65, and the hybrid algorithm OpenSSH 10.6 enabled uses ML-DSA-44, so an SSH login with HIDE is not post-quantum; what it avoids is a plaintext private key on disk. Treat the endpoint as sensitive: anything that can reach it can ask for a signature.
cd apps/hide-desktop
pnpm install --ignore-workspace
pnpm tauri build # installer
pnpm build:portable # single portable executableThe application calls the same Rust crates as the CLI; it contains no separate cryptographic code.
Key material never reaches the user interface layer. A test in
apps/hide-desktop/src-tauri/tests/interop.rs asserts that each surface can open what the other
produced, so they cannot silently diverge.
| Path | Purpose |
|---|---|
crates/hide-format |
Preamble, bounded canonical CBOR, portable-filename metadata |
crates/hide-crypto |
HPKE X-Wing wrapping, HKDF, HMAC, ChaCha20-Poly1305; secrets zeroize and cannot be printed |
crates/hide-sign |
Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures, detached signatures, challenge–response |
crates/hide-keyring |
Passphrase-sealed key files (Argon2id) and public-key armor |
crates/hide-object |
Envelope encryption and authenticated 64 KiB streaming |
crates/hide-epoch |
Epoch chains: forward security by erasure |
crates/hide-identity |
Hash-linked device log: create, enrol, revoke, recover |
crates/hide-transparency |
RFC 6962 Merkle tree, inclusion and consistency proofs |
crates/hide-mls |
MLS (RFC 9420) groups bound to HIDE identities via mls-rs |
crates/hide-ffi |
The C ABI every language binding calls |
crates/hide-wasm |
WebAssembly bindings for the browser (not published to crates.io) |
apps/hide-cli |
hide binary |
apps/hide-desktop |
Desktop application (Tauri) and the portable build |
sdk/ |
Python, Node, WASM, Go, Java, Ruby, PHP and .NET packages; the C header is crates/hide-ffi/include/hide.h |
packaging/ |
Homebrew, Scoop, WinGet and AUR manifests |
conformance/ |
Frozen vectors, rejection vectors, the independent Node verifier and the cross-surface check |
fuzz/ |
libFuzzer targets, run in CI |
docs/ |
Threat model, comparison, architecture, stability policy, tracker |
spec/hide-1.md |
Wire format (HIDE 1, release candidate); spec/hide-0.1.md is superseded |
Suite 1 is HPKE base mode with the X-Wing hybrid KEM (X25519 + ML-KEM-768), HKDF-SHA256 and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 in 64 KiB chunks, via the hpke and RustCrypto crates. Signatures are Ed25519 +
ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204). Key files are sealed with Argon2id. The transparency log is an RFC 6962 Merkle
tree. Group messaging is MLS (RFC 9420) through mls-rs, on the classical X25519 suite only. No
primitive is implemented here. Because X-Wing and HPKE-PQ are still drafts (as of 2026-11), every
dependency is pinned to an exact version. The wire format is frozen from 0.9.0
(spec/hide-1.md) and changes before 1.0 only to fix a security flaw; if the
final HPKE-PQ RFC changed X-Wing, HIDE would add a new suite id rather than alter suite 1
(docs/stability.md).
docs/threat-model.md— who the adversary is and what is not defendeddocs/comparison.md— HIDE against age, GPG, libsodium, MLS and KMS envelopesdocs/use-cases.md— where it fits and where it does notdocs/faq.mddocs/stability.md— what may change before 1.0 and how it is announceddocs/migrating-from-age.mddocs/architecture.md— crate boundaries and the C ABIdocs/audit-status.md— what has and has not been reviewedspec/— the wire format,SECURITY.md,CHANGELOG.md
No third party has audited HIDE, and an unaudited encryption tool should be treated as broken until
proven otherwise. An audit that would change that should cover: the HPKE/X-Wing composition and the
key schedule (spec/hide-1.md §3); the authenticated streaming and the FINAL rule (§5); the
signature transcripts and what a recipient can forge without one (§6–7); the identity log's
authority-at-position rule (§10); the epoch chain and what "erased" actually guarantees (§11); the
RFC 6962 proofs (§12); the MLS credential binding (§13); the C ABI's memory and panic handling in
hide-ffi; and the ssh-agent's confirmation path. Internal review found real defects in 0.7.0
(SECURITY.md lists them) and fuzzing found a key-file memory exhaustion fixed in
0.8.0 (HIDE-2026-001), which is evidence that more exist. Report privately,
either through GitHub's advisory form
(https://github.com/hide-protocol/hide/security/advisories/new) or by mail to
hide-security@codai.ro, as described in SECURITY.md; a finding is credited in the
CHANGELOG and in docs/advisories.md unless you prefer otherwise. There is no bounty and no
guaranteed response time: HIDE has one maintainer.
HIDE has no telemetry, update check, crash reporting or accounts. No code written in this
repository (the crates, the CLI, the SDKs, the desktop application's Rust and TypeScript) opens a
network connection; hide agent listens on a local socket or named pipe only. Two things are
outside that statement: the desktop application is built on Tauri and draws its window with the
system webview (WebView2 on Windows, WebKit elsewhere), components HIDE does not control, and the
Windows installer may download Microsoft's WebView2 runtime from Microsoft if it is not already
installed. The maintainer receives no personal data from your use of the software. The project
site is static and hosted on GitHub Pages; GitHub logs visitor IP addresses for security
(https://docs.github.com/en/pages/getting-started-with-github-pages/what-is-github-pages).
HIDE contains cryptographic software. Its source code and the binaries built from it are published openly and without restriction. Laws on the import, possession, use and re-export of encryption software differ between countries; you are responsible for complying with those that apply to you.
Apache-2.0 (LICENSE). The specification and the conformance vectors are under the same
licence, and nothing in the format requires any particular server or service. From 0.10.0 the
release archives and installers carry THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.txt, the licence texts of the
open-source components compiled into them.