ModuleJail runs as root and writes the module blacklist a host relies on to shrink its kernel attack surface. A flaw in it can weaken exactly the protection an operator believes is in place, so security reports are taken seriously.
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
- Open the Security tab of this repository.
- Click Report a vulnerability.
- Include the modulejail version (
modulejail --version), the OS/distro and kernel, and a reproduction if you have one.
This keeps the report private until a fix is ready and lets us issue a GitHub Security Advisory (and a CVE where warranted). Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
Use the private channel when a flaw could weaken the protection ModuleJail is meant to provide, or let untrusted input run with its privileges:
- Fails open. ModuleJail keeps or whitelists a module it should have blacklisted, silently leaving attack surface the operator believes is closed. Under-protecting is the failure that matters most for a tool like this.
- Integrity and supply chain. A signature-verification bypass, the
--self-updatepath fetching or accepting tampered bytes, or any way to subvert thecurl ... | shinstall into running attacker-controlled code as root. - Local exploitation of the tool. Symlink or TOCTOU races on the output path, unsafe temp-file handling, or whitelist-file parsing that a local user could abuse while modulejail runs as root.
- A host that will not boot, or a needed module getting blacklisted. This
is a correctness and availability bug, not attacker-driven exploitation. It
is real and worth fixing, so please report it as a normal
issue, not through the
private channel. Recovery is the Golden Rule in the README (enable
everything you need, then lock down) plus removing
/etc/modprobe.d/modulejail-blacklist.conf. - Vulnerabilities in the kernel modules ModuleJail blacklists. The model is "unused implies blacklist," not "vulnerable implies blacklist." A CVE in some kernel module is not a ModuleJail vulnerability.
ModuleJail ships as a single script on a rolling release. Only the latest
released version is supported; the fix for a security issue is to upgrade
(--self-update, or your distro package once available). Downstream
packagers (for example Debian) handle security updates for their packaged
versions through their own channels.
This is a small, volunteer-maintained project, so responses are best-effort rather than bound by an SLA. As a rough guide:
- Acknowledgement within a few days.
- A fix for a confirmed, serious issue in the next release, with a GitHub Security Advisory and credit to the reporter unless they prefer to remain anonymous.
Release tags from v1.3.0 onward are GPG-signed. See
Verifying releases in the README for the key
and the verification steps.