fix(bundles): the install security check reads what Compose applies, on every compose-up path; our own bundles pass it by kh0pper · Pull Request #508 · kh0pper/crow

fix(bundles): our own bundles pass the install security check, and a test keeps it that way

kh0pper

committed

7409ddb

fix(phone): the MCP server reports 0.2.5, matching the manifest bump

kh0pper

committed

7f4262f

fix(bundles): close ways to make Compose run config the install check never read

kh0pper

committed

a6c83cb

fix(bundles): check the compose model Docker Compose applies, on every path that runs compose up

kh0pper

committed

e18cfd7

fix(bundles): the compose check is an allowlist; Start uses the install-time consent; Compose gets no gateway secrets

kh0pper

committed

4a656e1

fix(bundles): check services behind every profile; managed hosting refuses host networking from the resolved model

kh0pper

committed

b15c133

fix(bundles): host paths inside Crow's home are an allowlist; GPU device paths are normalized; peers can't install

kh0pper

committed

60752e7

fix(bundles): the peer owner-only check compares the normalized path Express routes on

kh0pper

committed

727c050

fix(bundles): Start trusts only the repo manifest; a bundle can't claim Crow's own names or rewrite its control files

kh0pper

committed

5934136

fix(bundles): refuse host paths that are code the host runs: PATH folders and git checkouts

kh0pper

committed

bef8bc0

fix(bundles): data-folder names are reserved too; no bind inside a read-write bind; shipped files never read-write

kh0pper

committed

0cd52b3

fix(bundles): a bundle can't take another bundle's project, volume or network names, or its prefix-sibling folders

kh0pper

committed

aa1d348

fix(bundles): COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME stays allowed (co-hosted instances use it), held to the bundle's own project

kh0pper

committed

a699484

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fix(bundles): the install security check reads what Compose applies, on every compose-up path; our own bundles pass it - #508

fix(bundles): the install security check reads what Compose applies, on every compose-up path; our own bundles pass it#508
kh0pper merged 13 commits into
mainfrom
fix/bundle-install-guard

Commits on Oct 16, 2026

fix(bundles): our own bundles pass the install security check, and a test keeps it that way

fix(phone): the MCP server reports 0.2.5, matching the manifest bump

fix(bundles): close ways to make Compose run config the install check never read

fix(bundles): check the compose model Docker Compose applies, on every path that runs compose up

fix(bundles): the compose check is an allowlist; Start uses the install-time consent; Compose gets no gateway secrets

fix(bundles): check services behind every profile; managed hosting refuses host networking from the resolved model

fix(bundles): host paths inside Crow's home are an allowlist; GPU device paths are normalized; peers can't install

fix(bundles): the peer owner-only check compares the normalized path Express routes on

fix(bundles): Start trusts only the repo manifest; a bundle can't claim Crow's own names or rewrite its control files

fix(bundles): refuse host paths that are code the host runs: PATH folders and git checkouts

fix(bundles): data-folder names are reserved too; no bind inside a read-write bind; shipped files never read-write

fix(bundles): a bundle can't take another bundle's project, volume or network names, or its prefix-sibling folders

fix(bundles): COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME stays allowed (co-hosted instances use it), held to the bundle's own project