Tele drives real Telegram user accounts. A leaked session file hands the whole account to whoever reads it, so security reports are taken seriously and handled privately.
Do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Use GitHub's private reporting: open the repo's Security tab → Report a vulnerability. That opens a private advisory visible only to the maintainer until a fix is ready.
If that path is unavailable, mail the maintainer at mahyar.drama1313@gmail.com (the same address the npm package publishes under) with:
- what the issue is and which command triggers it
- the version (
tele --version) and platform - reproduction steps
- the impact you expect
Please do not include real session files, .env contents, phone numbers, 2FA passwords, or login codes in a report. Redact first — see docs/security.md.
- Acknowledgement within a few days.
- A fix and a release for confirmed issues; credit in the changelog unless you prefer otherwise.
- No bounty is offered.
The full threat model, trust boundaries, and deliberate exposures live in docs/security.md. Read it before assessing a report — several behaviors that look like bugs are documented, intentional design:
contact listandtakeout exportprint or write phone numbers unless you pass--redact-phones.tele rawruns at full account power and requires an explicit--allow-rawack.- The QR login fallback prints the
tg://login?token=…URI to an interactive stderr.
- Your own session file,
.env, orconfig.tomlbeing readable by another local user — set the permissions yourself;teletightens.envon load but cannot fix a permissive filesystem or umask. - Telegram-side behavior (flood waits, spam checks, account limits) that
telesurfaces as errors. - Output that contains your own message content, phone numbers, or invite links.