MetalVR has no releases yet. Security fixes go into main; build from the latest commit.
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub: on this repository's Security tab, choose Report a vulnerability. Do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a vulnerability.
Include what you can of:
- the MetalVR commit you built (
git rev-parse --short HEAD), and whethermetalvrdwas built with the ALVR driver; - the macOS version and Mac model, and for the Wine path the Wine and Mullion versions;
- the steps or program that trigger it, and a crash log if there is one;
- what an attacker could achieve, and from where: another process on the Mac, a Windows program in the prefix, or a machine on the network.
Do not send passwords, private keys, personal data, whole Wine prefixes or large archives.
You will get a reply within 7 days. Once the report is confirmed, a fix is prepared privately and released, and the advisory is published with credit to you unless you would rather stay anonymous.
MetalVR runs with the user's own privileges, beside the applications that use it. In scope:
- The server's protocol port.
metalvrdaccepts OpenXR runtimes on the loopback interface only and does not authenticate them: any process of any user on the same Mac can connect, read poses and submit frames. That much is by design. A way to reach the port from another machine, or to make a malformed request corrupt memory, crash the server or read another process's images, is a vulnerability. - Headset trust. A headset streams only if it was named with
--trust. Anything that lets an unnamed device receive the stream or send input is a vulnerability. Trust is by the name a device announces, as in ALVR: a device on the same network that announces a trusted headset's name is treated as that headset, and MetalVR adds no encryption to the stream. That is a known limit of the ALVR transport; run it on a network you trust. - ALVR's control API. MetalVR patches it to listen on the loopback
interface only (
patches/alvr). Reaching it from the network is a vulnerability. - The runtime in an application's process: memory-safety bugs in
metalvr_openxr.dllorlibmetalvr_openxr.dylibthat an application's input, or a server's answer, can trigger. - Shared images. A swapchain image is shared by name so the server can open it: a Mullion shared texture under Wine, a global IOSurface natively. Another process on the same Mac that learns or guesses the name can open it too; that is how the sharing works today, and a known limit. A way to write through it into the application's or the server's memory is a vulnerability.
- The build and install scripts: a dependency fetched without its pin
being checked, or
scripts/install-prefix.shwriting outside the prefix it was given.
Out of scope, and better reported where they belong (tell us as well if MetalVR is affected):
- Wine, which is not a sandbox: a Windows program can do whatever a Mac program run by the same user can. WineHQ, or metalsharp/MetalSharp-Wine for its own changes.
- Mullion: dttdrv/mullion.
- ALVR itself, its protocol and its headset client: alvr-org/ALVR.
- OpenComposite: its repository.
- The Khronos OpenXR loader: KhronosGroup/OpenXR-SDK-Source.