feat: jev brief readiness sensor on peer dispatch (0.0.58)

[okisdev]

summary

• adds an optional dispatch time check that asks TypeSafe AI's Jev (jev-1.13.0, a typed decision model that returns yes or no probabilities and no text) four fixed questions about every codex:codex-rescue and grok:grok-rescue brief of at least 200 characters: does it mix diagnosis with a fix, carry style intent only as prose, name no checkable completion condition, or ask for a sweep without named paths. an answer at or above 0.7 adds one brief-sensor.readiness-advisory line with the probability and the remedy to the orchestrator's context
• advisory tier only: the hook emits additionalContext and never a permissionDecision, so it cannot approve, deny or hold a dispatch. off unless TYPESAFE_API_KEY is in the session environment; a missing key, a 2.5 second timeout, any status other than 200 and a malformed body all produce no output. no retry, nothing written to disk, no new dependency (built in fetch)
• jev is not a lane: no agentic CLI, no sandbox, no text output, so no companion, no routing table row and no verified-versions.json key. the check is its own brief-sensor.mjs PreToolUse hook because worker-lifecycle.mjs is synchronous, fails closed on a throw in PreToolUse, and returns early for peer wrappers with no advisory path
• reviewable logic lives in plugins/fusion/scripts/lib/jev.mjs and plugins/fusion/scripts/brief-sensor.mjs; the rest is wiring (hooks.json, message registry, verification manifest), docs (README safety model, SECURITY.md data boundary) and the 0.0.58 release (changelog plus the seven version fields)

test plan

already verified

• npm test on the feature tree before the release commit -> 1175 tests, 1174 pass, 0 fail, 1 skipped (the existing skip)
• node --test tests/plugin-versions.test.mjs tests/verified-versions.test.mjs tests/routing-policy.test.mjs after the version bump -> 10/10 pass
• TYPESAFE_API_KEY=leak-check node --test tests/jev.test.mjs tests/brief-sensor.test.mjs tests/user-messages.test.mjs -> 23/23 pass; the suites scrub the inherited key and endpoint and only talk to a local node:http server
• live call against the real API through the hook script: a brief that mixes diagnosis, a fix and prose only style intent produced one advisory with p=0.93, 0.84 and 0.91; a spec grade brief produced no output; non peer agent, missing key, unreachable endpoint and a short prompt all exited 0 with empty stdout
• threshold replay over this repository's retained briefs: at 0.7, 0 of 21 accepted briefs flagged, 8 of 8 deliberately flawed briefs flagged, 4 clean controls under 0.3, scores stable within about 0.01 across runs, latency p50 about 350ms and p99 about 1300ms over 79 calls

reviewer should verify

• after the marketplace cache refresh and a session restart with TYPESAFE_API_KEY set, dispatch a brief to codex:codex-rescue that asks to find a cause and fix it in one package; expect one context line ending in [fusion:9825], the dispatch still proceeding, and the inline guard's own context still arriving (how Claude Code aggregates additionalContext from parallel PreToolUse hooks is undocumented)
• with the key unset, confirm a peer dispatch shows no new output and no added latency

notes

• the 0.7 threshold is provisional: labeled positives in this repository are scarce, so it rests on handwritten flawed briefs plus the false positive rate on accepted ones
• the key lives in the session environment: the grok child scrubs it with the other secret bearing variables, while the codex child inherits the environment unchanged, so a codex write shell can read it. SECURITY.md states this
• live only after marketplace cache refresh plus a session restart