feat: add rox-ci-image StackRox CI sandbox profile - #181
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WalkthroughThe workflow now builds ChangesStackRox CI sandbox image
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~30 minutes Change: Feature Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Go analysis is installed in the StackRox CI sandbox but unavailable to configured MCP clients, reducing the profile's expected coding-agent capabilities. Register the gopls MCP server before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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| # Go-language MCP support for repository analysis. Apollo supplies the Go | ||
| # toolchain; gopls is the only additional Go binary needed here. | ||
| ARG GOPLS_VERSION=0.20.0 |
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Piping a script from curl directly to bash is a significant security risk. The download could be compromised, leading to arbitrary code execution. Please download the script, verify its checksum, and then execute it.
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Addressed in 7b8d25d: the installer is downloaded to a temporary file, verified against the pinned SHA-256, then executed. The native installer URL is unversioned, so the checksum is updated intentionally when accepting a new installer revision.
| | tar xz -C /usr/local/bin | ||
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| ENV PATH="/sandbox/.venv/bin:/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" \ | ||
| VIRTUAL_ENV=/sandbox/.venv |
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The google-workspace-cli binary is downloaded and extracted without a checksum verification. This is a supply-chain vulnerability. Please add a sha256sum check, similar to how the gh CLI is installed earlier in this Dockerfile.
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Addressed in 7b8d25d: the Google Workspace archive is downloaded to a temporary file, verified against the release-provided SHA-256, then extracted.
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Updated after review: the profile now uses a pinned NVIDIA community image as an |
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| # Keep the policy path used by the community image even though npm puts the | ||
| # executable in /usr/bin on this UBI-based image. | ||
| RUN ln -sf /usr/bin/opencode /usr/local/bin/opencode |
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Piping curl to bash is a security risk. The downloaded script is executed without any integrity checks, making the build vulnerable to malicious code and non-reproducible. Please consider downloading a versioned binary and verifying its checksum before execution, similar to the secure installation of the gh CLI earlier in this file.
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Addressed in 7b8d25d: the Claude installer is downloaded to a temporary file and SHA-256 verified before execution. The native installer remains the supported install path; the checksum makes the unversioned URL reproducible.
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| # Use the same uv-managed Python contract as the community base image. The | ||
| # Apollo system Python is 3.9, while current MCP integrations require 3.10+. | ||
| COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.10.8 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv |
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The Python version specified, 3.14.3, is not a valid or released version of Python. This is likely a typo and will cause the image build to fail. Please use a valid and available Python version, for example, a version from the 3.12 series.
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This warning is incorrect. Python 3.14.3 is the pinned version used by the NVIDIA OpenShell community base contract and is available from uv's managed CPython distributions. The Apollo-based image built successfully and the runtime smoke test reports Python 3.14.3, so downgrading would diverge from the base contract.
| cloudpickle \ | ||
| mcp-atlassian==0.21.1 \ | ||
| && uv cache clean | ||
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The Google Workspace CLI is installed by piping a downloaded archive directly to tar without verification. This is risky, as a corrupted or malicious archive could compromise the image. Please add a step to verify the checksum of the downloaded .tar.gz file before extracting it.
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Addressed in 7b8d25d: the Google Workspace archive is downloaded and SHA-256 verified before extraction.
| opencode-ai@1.18.30 \ | ||
| @openai/codex@0.117.0 \ | ||
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ |
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Globally overriding python3 by symlinking to a newer version in /usr/local/bin could cause issues with tools from the base apollo-ci image that might rely on the system's Python 3.9. It might be safer to not create these symlinks and instead rely on the PATH order or explicitly call the new python where needed.
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Addressed in f08ebd0: removed the global /usr/local/bin/python3 and /usr/local/bin/python symlinks. The rox-ci-image system Python remains intact; the uv-managed environment is explicit for MCP installation and is first in the runtime PATH.
| # still owns credentials; no credential values are baked into this image. | ||
| RUN uv venv --python "${PYTHON_VERSION}" --seed /sandbox/.venv \ | ||
| && uv pip install --python /sandbox/.venv/bin/python \ | ||
| cloudpickle \ |
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While the install.sh script is checksummed, the script itself might download the claude binary from a URL that is not version-pinned or checksummed (e.g., a 'latest' URL). This could make the build non-reproducible and vulnerable to a supply chain attack if the download location is compromised. It would be safer to download the binary from a versioned URL and verify its checksum directly.
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Skipped with reason: the official native installer is the supported Claude installation path. It resolves the platform release, downloads the release manifest, and verifies the binary against the manifest SHA-256 before installing. There is no separate stable versioned binary URL exposed by that installer; the installer script itself is checksum-pinned here.
| # Claude Code uses its native installer rather than the deprecated npm path. | ||
| # The installer URL is not versioned, so pin its current contents explicitly; | ||
| # update the checksum when intentionally accepting a new installer revision. | ||
| ARG CLAUDE_INSTALL_SHA256=3a68d3406cf674e17bed1733a4dcf37805e2e47d87417700007d7e1aa766a944 |
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Installing the tar npm package globally might shadow the system's tar executable. This npm package is a JavaScript library for handling tar archives and its executable may have different behavior than the standard GNU tar, potentially breaking scripts that expect the system version.
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Skipped with reason: verified in the built image that /usr/bin/tar remains GNU tar 1.34. npm installs the tar Node library under /usr/lib/node_modules and does not replace the system tar executable; the Dockerfile now documents that boundary.
| && rm -f /tmp/gh.tgz | ||
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| # Use the same uv-managed Python contract as the community base image. The | ||
| # The rox-ci-image system Python is 3.9, while current MCP integrations require |
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The specified PYTHON_VERSION is 3.14.3. This appears to be a typo, as Python 3.14 has not been released. This will likely cause the uv python install command on line 72 to fail. Please use a valid and available Python version (e.g., 3.12).
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Skipped with reason: this is the same false-positive Python warning already addressed above. Python 3.14.3 is the pinned version used by the NVIDIA OpenShell base contract and is installed by uv; the built image and runtime smoke test both pass with Python 3.14.3.
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| # Coding agents and the JSON-schema utility used by StackRox workflows. These | ||
| # versions mirror the current StackRox sandbox profile where applicable. | ||
| RUN npm install -g \ |
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Installing the tar package from npm globally is risky. It could shadow the system tar utility (installed on line 42), which may have different behavior or flags. If this JS-based tar is needed, consider installing it without the -g flag in a local node_modules directory to avoid conflicts with essential system commands.
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Skipped with reason: this is the same tar-shadowing concern already checked above. The built image retains GNU tar 1.34 at /usr/bin/tar; npm installs the tar Node library under /usr/lib/node_modules and does not replace that executable.
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Inline comments:
In `@profiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/mcp.json`:
- Line 10: Update the MCP server registrations in mcp.json to include the
installed gopls binary as the gopls-mcp entry, matching the default profile’s
configuration while preserving the existing atlassian registration.
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.github/workflows/images.ymlprofiles/stackrox/README.mdprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/CLAUDE.mdprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/Dockerfileprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/claude.jsonprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/mcp.jsonprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/opencode.jsonprofiles/stackrox/image/sandbox-stackrox-ci/settings.json
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| COPY --from=openshell-base /sandbox/.agents/skills/ /sandbox/.agents/skills/ | ||
| COPY --from=openshell-base /sandbox/.bashrc /sandbox/.bashrc | ||
| COPY --from=openshell-base /sandbox/.profile /sandbox/.profile | ||
| COPY policy-overlay.yaml /tmp/openshell-policy-overlay.yaml |
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Extracting a remote tarball directly into /usr/local/bin is risky. The archive could contain malicious files or ../ path traversals. It would be safer to extract to a temporary directory, verify the contents, and then move only the expected binary to its final destination, similar to how the gh CLI is installed earlier in this file.
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Addressed in 998a546: the archive is checksum-verified, extracted into a temporary directory with ownership and permission metadata disabled, and restricted to the expected ./gws member before install copies only that file to /usr/local/bin.
| && uv pip install --python /sandbox/.venv/bin/python \ | ||
| cloudpickle \ | ||
| mcp-atlassian==0.21.1 \ | ||
| && uv cache clean |
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Executing a downloaded script (install.sh) as root is a security risk. Although the script is checksummed, its contents are opaque and could have unintended side effects. For better security and reproducibility, consider inspecting the script and replicating its necessary actions directly within the Dockerfile.
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Addressed in 998a546: removed the downloaded installer execution entirely. The image now downloads the versioned Claude Code 2.1.269 Linux binary directly and verifies its release-manifest SHA-256 before installing it.
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| { | |||
| "permissions": { | |||
| "defaultMode": "bypassPermissions", | |||
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The combination of bypassPermissions and a broad allow list effectively grants the agent unrestricted access to perform any action, including file system operations and unrestricted web access. This presents a potential security risk. Consider defining a more restrictive permission set tailored to the intended CI tasks.
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Addressed in 45cf88b: removed the image-wide bypassPermissions default and replaced Bash(), Write(), and unrestricted edit permissions with the ACS triage command allowlist, artifact-only writes, and explicit denials for credential-sensitive paths and mutation commands. A workflow can still request a broader mode explicitly when that is intentional.
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| { | |||
| "permissions": { | |||
| "defaultMode": "bypassPermissions", | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The combination of bypassPermissions and a broad allow list effectively grants the agent unrestricted access to perform any action, including file system operations and unrestricted web access. This presents a potential security risk. Consider defining a more restrictive permission set tailored to the intended CI tasks.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in 45cf88b: removed the image-wide bypassPermissions default and replaced Bash(), Write(), and unrestricted edit permissions with the ACS triage command allowlist, artifact-only writes, and explicit denials for credential-sensitive paths and mutation commands. A workflow can still request a broader mode explicitly when that is intentional.
| @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ | |||
| { | |||
| "permissions": { | |||
| "defaultMode": "bypassPermissions", | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The combination of bypassPermissions and a broad allow list effectively grants the agent unrestricted access to perform any action, including file system operations and unrestricted web access. This presents a potential security risk. Consider defining a more restrictive permission set tailored to the intended CI tasks.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in 45cf88b: removed the image-wide bypassPermissions default and replaced Bash(), Write(), and unrestricted edit permissions with the ACS triage command allowlist, artifact-only writes, and explicit denials for credential-sensitive paths and mutation commands. A workflow can still request a broader mode explicitly when that is intentional.
| @openai/codex@0.117.0 \ | ||
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force |
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Running npm install -g as the root user is a security risk. Package installation can execute arbitrary pre/post-install scripts with root privileges, creating a supply chain vulnerability if any of the downloaded packages or their dependencies are compromised. Please consider alternatives, such as running npm as a non-privileged user or using the --ignore-scripts flag.
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Addressed in c869cbe: pinned npm packages are now installed as the unprivileged sandbox user into a temporary prefix, so package lifecycle hooks do not run with root privileges. The image copies only the resulting package tree and command wrappers into their final system paths, then removes the staging prefix. Smoke tests pass for opencode, codex, copilot, and ajv.
| @openai/codex@0.117.0 \ | ||
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force |
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Running npm install -g as the root user is a security risk. Package installation can execute arbitrary pre/post-install scripts with root privileges, creating a supply chain vulnerability if any of the downloaded packages or their dependencies are compromised. Please consider alternatives, such as running npm as a non-privileged user or using the --ignore-scripts flag.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c869cbe: pinned npm packages are now installed as the unprivileged sandbox user into a temporary prefix, so package lifecycle hooks do not run with root privileges. The image copies only the resulting package tree and command wrappers into their final system paths, then removes the staging prefix. Smoke tests pass for opencode, codex, copilot, and ajv.
| "permissions": { | ||
| "defaultMode": "acceptEdits", | ||
| "allow": [ | ||
| "Bash(cat *)", |
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This file allows broad Bash permissions for commands like cat, ls, find, and grep. For better security and reliability, the agent should be restricted to using the corresponding structured tools (Read, Glob, Grep) which are also enabled. The overly broad Bash permissions should be removed.
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Addressed in 2c70996: removed the redundant Bash permissions for cat, ls, find, grep, head, tail, sed, sort, tr, wc, and similar file-inspection operations. The profile already enables Claude's structured Read, Glob, and Grep tools; Bash remains only for workflow-specific commands that need process execution.
| ln -sf "${skill}" "/sandbox/.claude/skills/$(basename "${skill}")"; \ | ||
| done \ | ||
| && printf '%s\n' \ | ||
| 'export PATH="/sandbox/.venv/bin:/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"' \ |
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The ENV PATH=... directive on this line overwrites the PATH from the base image and omits standard directories like /usr/sbin and /sbin. This will prevent tools installed in the image (e.g., ip from iproute) from being found by the shell. The PATH should be extended rather than replaced, for example: ENV PATH=/sandbox/.venv/bin:/sandbox/.venv/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin.
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Addressed in 2c70996: extended PATH with /usr/sbin and /sbin after the base image PATH entries. The rebuilt image now resolves ip at /usr/sbin/ip as well as the agent and MCP binaries.
| && rm -f /tmp/gh.tgz | ||
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| # Use the same uv-managed Python contract as the community base image. The | ||
| # rox-ci-image system Python is 3.9, while current MCP integrations require |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Extracting an archive directly into a system directory like /usr/bin using tar -C /usr/bin is risky. Although the archive checksum is verified, a vulnerability in the tar utility itself could potentially lead to files being written to unintended locations. A safer, defense-in-depth approach is to extract the archive to a temporary directory first, and then use install or cp to move the specific required binary into /usr/bin, as is done for the gws and claude binaries elsewhere in this file.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: the verified archive is now extracted into a temporary directory, the expected gh member is checked, and only that binary is installed into /usr/bin.
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force | ||
| USER root |
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The versions for the npm packages installed here are hardcoded. For better maintainability and security, please define these versions using ARG variables at the top of the Dockerfile, similar to how GH_VERSION and CLAUDE_VERSION are handled. This practice makes it significantly easier to audit and update dependencies when new versions or security patches are released.
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Addressed in c6beccb: the npm dependency versions are now explicit Docker ARGs so updates are reviewable in one place.
| # https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell-Community/tree/main/sandboxes/base | ||
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| ARG OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/openshell-community/sandboxes/base@sha256:aeef1c63f00e2913ea002ccb3aaf925f338b5c5d70e63576f0d95c16a138044e | ||
| ARG BASE_IMAGE=quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci:stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911 |
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The base image quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci is referenced by a mutable tag (stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911). This creates a risk of supply-chain attacks if the tag is ever updated to point to a compromised image. For improved security and reproducibility, please pin this base image using its immutable digest (@sha256:...), similar to how OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE is pinned on the preceding line.
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Addressed in c6beccb: the requested rox-ci-image tag is now pinned to its immutable Quay digest; the tag is retained in a comment for traceability.
| && rm -f /tmp/gh.tgz | ||
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| # Use the same uv-managed Python contract as the community base image. The | ||
| # rox-ci-image system Python is 3.9, while current MCP integrations require |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Extracting an archive directly into a system directory like /usr/bin using tar -C /usr/bin is risky. Although the archive checksum is verified, a vulnerability in the tar utility itself could potentially lead to files being written to unintended locations. A safer, defense-in-depth approach is to extract the archive to a temporary directory first, and then use install or cp to move the specific required binary into /usr/bin, as is done for the gws and claude binaries elsewhere in this file.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: the verified archive is extracted to a temporary directory and only the expected gh binary is installed.
| # https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell-Community/tree/main/sandboxes/base | ||
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| ARG OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/openshell-community/sandboxes/base@sha256:aeef1c63f00e2913ea002ccb3aaf925f338b5c5d70e63576f0d95c16a138044e | ||
| ARG BASE_IMAGE=quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci:stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911 |
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The base image quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci is referenced by a mutable tag (stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911). This creates a risk of supply-chain attacks if the tag is ever updated to point to a compromised image. For improved security and reproducibility, please pin this base image using its immutable digest (@sha256:...), similar to how OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE is pinned on the preceding line.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: the rox-ci-image tag is pinned to its immutable digest.
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force | ||
| USER root |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The versions for the npm packages installed here are hardcoded. For better maintainability and security, please define these versions using ARG variables at the top of the Dockerfile, similar to how GH_VERSION and CLAUDE_VERSION are handled. This practice makes it significantly easier to audit and update dependencies when new versions or security patches are released.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: npm package versions are explicit Docker ARGs.
| @github/copilot@1.0.16 \ | ||
| ajv-cli@5.0.0 \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force | ||
| USER root |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The versions for the npm packages installed here are hardcoded. For better maintainability and security, please define these versions using ARG variables at the top of the Dockerfile, similar to how GH_VERSION and CLAUDE_VERSION are handled. This practice makes it significantly easier to audit and update dependencies when new versions or security patches are released.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: npm package versions are explicit Docker ARGs.
| # https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell-Community/tree/main/sandboxes/base | ||
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| ARG OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/openshell-community/sandboxes/base@sha256:aeef1c63f00e2913ea002ccb3aaf925f338b5c5d70e63576f0d95c16a138044e | ||
| ARG BASE_IMAGE=quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci:stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911 |
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The base image quay.io/stackrox-io/apollo-ci is referenced by a mutable tag (stackrox-build-0.5.14-1-g9bed4c4911). This creates a risk of supply-chain attacks if the tag is ever updated to point to a compromised image. For improved security and reproducibility, please pin this base image using its immutable digest (@sha256:...), similar to how OPENSHELL_BASE_IMAGE is pinned on the preceding line.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: the rox-ci-image tag is pinned to its immutable digest.
| && rm -f /tmp/gh.tgz | ||
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| # Use the same uv-managed Python contract as the community base image. The | ||
| # rox-ci-image system Python is 3.9, while current MCP integrations require |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Extracting an archive directly into a system directory like /usr/bin using tar -C /usr/bin is risky. Although the archive checksum is verified, a vulnerability in the tar utility itself could potentially lead to files being written to unintended locations. A safer, defense-in-depth approach is to extract the archive to a temporary directory first, and then use install or cp to move the specific required binary into /usr/bin, as is done for the gws and claude binaries elsewhere in this file.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Addressed in c6beccb: the verified archive is extracted to a temporary directory and only the expected gh binary is installed.
| RUN uv venv --python "${PYTHON_VERSION}" --seed /sandbox/.venv \ | ||
| && uv pip install --python /sandbox/.venv/bin/python \ | ||
| cloudpickle \ | ||
| mcp-atlassian==0.21.1 \ |
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The cloudpickle Python package is not pinned to a specific version. Unpinned dependencies can lead to non-reproducible builds and may inadvertently introduce vulnerabilities if a new version with a security issue is released. Please pin the version of cloudpickle.
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Addressed in c6beccb: cloudpickle==3.1.2 is now pinned.
| && useradd -r -g sandbox -d /sandbox -s /bin/bash sandbox \ | ||
| && mkdir -p /sandbox \ | ||
| && chown sandbox:sandbox /sandbox | ||
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The Dockerfile specifies a SHA256 checksum for the gh CLI for the amd64 architecture, but the workflow is designed to be multi-platform. This will cause the build to fail on other architectures like arm64. To ensure the build works across all specified platforms, you should provide checksums for each architecture and use a case statement or similar mechanism to select the correct one based on the TARGETPLATFORM build argument. For example:
ARG GH_VERSION=2.100.0
ARG GH_SHA256_AMD64=e4d4bb4498e8d007abe545b6568926793ace1b6447da598294a610018cb164be
ARG GH_SHA256_ARM64=...
RUN \
case "${TARGETPLATFORM}" in \
"linux/amd64") GH_SHA256="${GH_SHA256_AMD64}" ;; \
"linux/arm64") GH_SHA256="${GH_SHA256_ARM64}" ;; \
*) echo "Unsupported platform: ${TARGETPLATFORM}"; exit 1 ;; \
esac && \
curl ... && \
echo "${GH_SHA256} /tmp/gh.tgz" | sha256sum -c -This change is necessary to maintain the integrity and reproducibility of the build across different architectures.
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Skipped with reason: this profile is intentionally published for linux/amd64 only because the rox-ci-image toolchain is amd64-only. The workflow matrix does not build this profile for arm64.
| "Edit(artifacts/*)", | ||
| "Glob", | ||
| "Grep", | ||
| "Agent", |
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The settings.json file allows WebFetch and WebSearch capabilities, which permit unrestricted network access. This contradicts the restrictive network policy defined in policy.yaml, which only allows access to Go module repositories. Allowing broad web access creates a security risk by providing a potential vector for data exfiltration or for fetching unauthorized and potentially malicious content. To maintain a consistent and secure security posture, WebFetch and WebSearch should be removed from the allowed permissions.
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Addressed in c6beccb: WebFetch and WebSearch are no longer allowed in the agent settings. Network access is supplied by provider profiles or explicit workflow policy, not a broad agent permission.
| # before installing so the image remains reproducible. | ||
| ARG GH_VERSION=2.100.0 | ||
| ARG GH_SHA256_AMD64=e4d4bb4498e8d007abe545b6568926793ace1b6447da598294a610018cb164be | ||
| RUN curl -fsSL "https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/download/v${GH_VERSION}/gh_${GH_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" -o /tmp/gh.tgz \ |
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The selected Python version 3.14.3 does not exist. The build will fail when uv python install runs. Please use a valid Python version, such as 3.12.4.
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Skipped with reason: uv downloads the pinned CPython 3.14.3 python-build-standalone artifact successfully; this is not the base image's system Python. The local amd64 image build and runtime smoke test both verify Python 3.14.3.
| tar@7.5.11 \ | ||
| @hono/node-server@1.19.11 \ | ||
| opencode-ai@1.18.30 \ | ||
| @openai/codex@0.117.0 \ |
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Using cp -a to install these packages is a security risk. Because npm install was run as the sandbox user, the source files are owned by that user. The -a flag preserves ownership, meaning executables like opencode and ajv in /usr/bin will be owned by the unprivileged sandbox user. This could be exploited. Please remove the -a flag or add a chown root:root for the installed files.
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Addressed in c6beccb: the copied npm module tree and generated command links are explicitly owned by root after installation.
| - profile: sandbox-stackrox-ci | ||
| tag_prefix: sandbox-stackrox-ci | ||
| platforms: linux/amd64 | ||
| env: |
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The shellcheck tool is not installed in the sandbox. The run-shellcheck job will fail. The .github/workflows/ci.yml file should be updated to install shellcheck.
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Skipped with reason: this repository has no run-shellcheck job. Static CI runs actionlint and bash -n; adding an unrelated shellcheck installation is outside this image-profile change.
| && uv cache clean | ||
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| # Coding agents and the JSON-schema utility used by StackRox workflows. These | ||
| # versions mirror the current StackRox sandbox profile where applicable. |
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The cp command on this line, combined with the installation of the tar npm package, overwrites the system's tar binary with a JavaScript implementation. This creates a risk of breaking tools or scripts that expect GNU tar and its specific command-line flags (such as the tar command used on line 122). Consider renaming the binary from the npm package or excluding it from the cp command.
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Addressed in 8c2cf1f: npm bin links are copied individually and the tar link is excluded, then the build asserts that /usr/bin/tar is still GNU tar.
| @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ | |||
| export PATH="/sandbox/.venv/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin" | |||
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The PATH exported here is incomplete because it omits /usr/local/go/bin, which is required for the Go toolchain. Although the Dockerfile later appends a corrected PATH to this file, the base file should be correct to ensure a consistent and reliable environment for interactive shells and to simplify the Dockerfile logic.
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Addressed in 8c2cf1f: the vendored .bashrc now exports the complete profile PATH, including /usr/local/go/bin, /usr/sbin, and /sbin, plus the writable Go cache locations.
| "@github/copilot@${NPM_COPILOT_VERSION}" \ | ||
| "ajv-cli@${NPM_AJV_VERSION}" \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force | ||
| USER root |
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This RUN command copies files installed by the sandbox user into system locations as root. This is a potential privilege escalation vulnerability. A malicious dependency could place an executable in /tmp/npm-global/bin which would then be copied to /usr/bin and owned by root. The download and installation should be done as a single user, or the artifacts should be validated before the privileged copy.
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Addressed in bb594fc: the privileged install now copies only the four expected npm entry points (opencode, codex, copilot, and ajv) and requires each path to exist. Unexpected files under the unprivileged npm prefix are not promoted into /usr/bin.
| "@github/copilot@${NPM_COPILOT_VERSION}" \ | ||
| "ajv-cli@${NPM_AJV_VERSION}" \ | ||
| && npm cache clean --force | ||
| USER root |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This RUN command copies files installed by the sandbox user into system locations as root. This is a potential privilege escalation vulnerability. A malicious dependency could place an executable in /tmp/npm-global/bin which would then be copied to /usr/bin and owned by root. The download and installation should be done as a single user, or the artifacts should be validated before the privileged copy.
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Addressed in bb594fc: the privileged install now copies only the four expected npm entry points (opencode, codex, copilot, and ajv) and requires each path to exist. Unexpected files under the unprivileged npm prefix are not promoted into /usr/bin.
Summary
Why this is stacked
This follows refactor/acs-triage-tools so it can be evaluated after the shared StackRox image refactor and ACS tooling changes. Merge the base PR first, then this PR.
Validation
Scope
This is an opt-in experimental profile. It does not change the default StackRox image or add credentials to the image; providers remain OpenShell-managed.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
sandbox-stackrox-ciprofile for StackRox CI workflows.Documentation