fix(passwordless): encode session IDs in send URLs - #441
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Session IDs must not introduce path separators or reinterpret literal percent-encoded input when sending passwordless sessions. Apply the same encoding responsibility used by generated services without changing the shared HTTP client's behavior.
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Description
rawurlencode()before building thesendSessionURL, matching generated services and the HTTP client's documented caller contract.Addresses VULN-1251.
Validation
php vendor/bin/phpunit tests/PasswordlessTest.php: 4 tests, 44 assertions.composer ci: formatting and PHPStan pass; 352 tests, 1,713 assertions, 3 skipped.git diff --check: passes.Scope
Exact
.and..session IDs remain unchanged byrawurlencode(), so server-dependent dot-segment normalization still applies to those two literal values. Shared HTTP-client defense-in-depth is outside this local fix. Tests use mocked requests; no live-infrastructure probe was performed.Documentation
No documentation changes are required; the public API is unchanged.